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I.

SOME BEGINNING THOUGHTS

The public perceives that we have too much litigation. That which it accepts
as legitimate is seen as too expensive, too time consuming. Many would deny
the label of legitimacy to much litigation that we have. And within that which
is concededly justifiable, much takes place that is thought unnecessary and unreasonably expensive, resulting in excessive use of time, resources and litigation energies generally.
Varying explanations have been offered. We are a litigious society. There
are too many opportunists among us, people willing to sue over nothing. There
are too many hard ball playing corporations who would rather pay a lawyer's
exorbitant fee than a consumer's just but more modest claim. We have too many
lawyers. Their fees are too high. The system encourages building massive files
before effecting settlements not that different from what might have been available
much earlier and at a much lower cost.
Though the too-much-litigation phenomenon is real and has a complex variety of causes, the public passion for the moment seems focused upon the socalled frivolous lawsuit, an often misunderstood label which ought to be seen
as including wholly meritless pursuit of complaints, of claims, defenses, motions and other legal papers. I Frivolous filings, where they have to be resisted,
impose great, sometimes ruinous, costs upon parties who in fairness should not
be subjected to such. These costs include not only the out-of-pocket variety but
consumption of resources and energies incident to litigation and, indeed, the
necessity for budgeting in anticipation of litigation either through insurance premiums, reserves or other means.
*Justice, Supreme Court of Mississippi; B.A., University of Mississippi, 1962; J.D., Harvard University, 1965.
The views expressed here are solely those of the author. Nothing said in this article should be taken as reflecting
the views of any other Justice or person associated with the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
1. "Frivolous filings" is the generic label I will use in what follows to connote this recurring phenomenon, properly understood.
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There is a second dimension to the problem. Our judicial resources are limited. The perception is that those limited resources are overburdened because
our courts have to deal with numerous frivolous filings, thus decreasing the
judicial resources available to the legitimate litigant. This perception inevitably generates political pressures for increases in the quantity of judicial resources
available which in turn increases that part of the cost of justice that must be
borne by society as a whole.
The major procedural mechanism available in Mississippi law for responding to the problem of the frivolous filing is Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules
of Civil Procedure. 2 Of course, courts inherently have authority to sanction
the obstreperous lawyer or litigant who abuses the system. 3 That inherent authority, augmented and directed by Rule 11, would appear to afford a very great
power to deal with the frivolous filing and to do so effectively. Curiously,
perhaps, not all see it so.
Circumstances in recent years have combined to raise questions regarding
the viability of our Rule 11. Most significant is that, while the Mississippi Rules
of Civil Procedure have been generally patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, we have not amended our Rule 11 to conform to current Federal
Rule 11. All perceive that the 1983 amendments to Federal Rule 11 were intended to enlarge greatly upon the district court's power to impose sanctions
to deter frivolous filings. 4 New Federal Rule 11 has had just this effect and
has generated a veritable explosion of satellite litigation . 5 Anecdotes abound
of federal courts imposing five- and six-figure sanctions against attorneys. 6 These
results have been wrought by deletion of the pre-1983 "wilfulness" language
and, as well, elimination of discretion in imposing sanctions once liability findings
have been made - "may" has been changed to "shall" - augmented by a lot
of tough talk from the Federal Rules Advisory Committee. 7 By way of contrast, many see Mississippi's Rule 11 as a veritable toothless tiger. Moreover,
we have had relatively few occasions when sanctions have been imposed in Mississippi's trial courts under our Rule 11.8 The so-called tort reform forces per2. Because the overwhelming majority of court filings (and, presumably, of frivolous filings) are made
in the trial courts, our focus is there and upon Rule 11. Frivolous filings at the appellate level are subject
to Miss. SUP. CT. R. 46(d). Much of what we say here applies as well to Rule 46(d), subject, of course,
to the language of that rule.
3. See infra Part IV(F).
4. See, e.g., Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1014-15 (1988); Untereiner,
A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J. 901, 903-04 (1988).
5. See Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 1013. This and many other troublesome conclusions have been
drawn regarding the federal experience. I assume the correctness of such conclusions but would quickly
point out that, at least insofar as I am aware, there is available at this time little reliable empirical data regarding
the post-1983 federal experience.
6. E.g., Unioil v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 85 (1987) (affirmance of Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs attorney for nearly $300,000).
7. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
8. Not always stated but always lurking as one explanation why so few sanctions have been imposed
in state courts is Mississippi's system of elected judges. A trial judge knows that every lawyer he sanctions
is a potential opponent in the next election.
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ceived the desirability of a legislative remedy which has in fact led to the passage
of House Bill No. 772, the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988,9 an enactment which is nothing short of a would-be amendment to Rule 11.
Reflection about these matters makes two points clear. First, the response
to the problem of frivolous filings, 10 though a matter of general and legitimate
public concern, is ultimately the responsibility of the judiciary of this state, not
its legislature. Enactment of the Litigation Accountability Act was altogether
unfortunate. 1 1 If a problem was perceived, it should have been attacked by application to the Rules Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court, 12 not by enactment of the legislature.
Second, present Mississippi Rule 11 vests substantial power in the trial courts
to respond to the frivolous filing. True, Mississippi has not copied the 1983
amendment to Federal Rule 11. It is even quite true that Mississippi Rule 11
is a rather awkward and confusingly worded rule, although this defect is ameliorated by remembrance that independent of the rule courts have inherent authority
to protect themselves from parties and attorneys who abuse the system. Still,
as we hope to demonstrate below, this inherent authority aside, Rule 11 is anything but a toothless tiger. Put otherwise, the problem is not the lack of authority
for state judicial response to the frivolous filing but the failure to exercise the
authority which is demonstrably available. That failure, fair reflection suggests,
is not due to any lack of backbone on the part of Mississippi's judiciary but
to substantial uncertainty regarding the meaning and extent of the inherent power
and the awkward structure and confusing wording of Rule 11. I trust that the
present effort will move us toward reducing these uncertainties.
II. THE RESPONSE TO FRivoLous FILING
IS A MATTER OF JUDICIAL POWER

We must first face the question, whence the authority to fight the frivolous
filing. To some this may seem to be reinvention of the wheel. The Litigation
Accountability Act of 1988 mandates that we confront the point, for that enactment may only be seen as a challenge to the seemingly obvious proposition that

9. See Miss. LAWS, ch. 495 (1988) (codified as Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-55-1 to -15 (Supp. 1988)).
The Act was patterned after the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, adopted in 1987, ALA. CODE §§
12-19-270 to -276 (Supp. 1988), and a model bill proposed by the American Tort Reform Association.
10. Like the point noted above, supra note 5, I am aware of no useful empirical studies regarding the
nature and extent of the problem of frivolous filings in state courts. I trust all would admit this is a major lack!
11. I say this remembering the bitter struggle following supreme court promulgation of the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure back in 1981. Peace has been restored and there seems to be general acceptance
of the court's inherent rule-making power by those once opposed. Why run the risk of reopening the so recently healed wounds?
12. The Advisory Committee on Rules was created by Order of the Supreme Court of Mississippi entered November 9, 1983. Its membership includes a broad cross-section of the bench and bar. The committee receives, reviews and critiques all proposals for adoption of rules or amendments of existing rules and
forwards its recommendations to the supreme court.
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curbing the waste of judicial and litigant resources is a judicial problem. 13
Put positively, the case for legislative authority must rest on the notion that
the frivolous filing has an adverse impact upon the public welfare and that appeals for redress should be addressed to the department of government thought
charged to wield the police power. Though the legislature is the source of much
law implementing the police power, nothing in the constitution places the power off limits to the executive and judiciary.
The judicious use of the legal machinery of this state is the primary concern
of the department of government where that use - and any misuse - takes
place: the judicial department. The authority to act upon that concern is similarly situated. That authority has become known as the rule-making power.
However problematic the point may once have been, 14 the rule-making power
has now been established as a permanent part of the authority of the Supreme
Court of Mississippi. We are all now like the man, asked whether he believed
in infant baptism, who replied, "Believe in it?! I've seen it done!" The tangible
product of our baptism may be found in West Publishing's volume, Mississippi
RULES OF COURT. Whether salvation or damnation is likely to emanate from
that baptism is, of course, a matter about which reasonable persons might
disagree.
Still, it is helpful to reflect upon whence we have come. Twenty years ago
Chief Justice W. N. Ethridge, Jr., speaking for the court in Southern Pacific
Lumber Co. v. Reynolds 15 wrote: "The phrase 'judicial power' in Section 144
of the Constitution includes the power to make rules of practice and procedure,
not inconsistent with the Constitution, for the efficient disposition of judicial
business."
In Newell v. State16 then Justice Neville Patterson declared for a unanimous
court that "[t]he inherent power of this Court to promulgate procedural rules
emanates from the fundamental constitutional concept of the separation of powers
' 17
and the vesting of judicial powers in the courts."
The rules product of the last ten years has been quite substantial. In the last
five years rule-making has proceeded at a dizzying pace.
13. One leading Mississippi newspaper editorially endorsed the Litigation Accountability Act, and en
route said: "Judges, through previous court rulings, can at present throw out frivolous actions, but this authority
would be reinforced by statute." End the farce: Curb those frivolous lawsuits, The Clarion Ledger, April
12, 1988, at 6A. Just how this reinforcement process would work, the editorialist never explains. More
to the point, why it is needed is not mentioned. If there is in Mississippi law a valid rule adequate by its
terms, why does that need to "be reinforced by statute"? Implicit in the editorialist's comments is the mistaken notion that statute law is somehow better law than the other models available.
14. See Page, ConstitutionalismandJudicialRulemaking: Lessons from the Crisisin Mississippi, 3 Miss.
C.L. REV. 1 (1982); Herbert, Process, Procedure and Constitutionalism:A Response to Professor Page,
3 Miss. C.L. REv. 45 (1982); Franck, Practiceand Procedurein Mississippi:An Ancient Recipe for Modern
Reform, 43 Miss. L. J. 287 (1972).
15. 206 So. 2d 334, 335 (Miss. 1968).
16. 308 So. 2d 71, 76 (Miss. 1975).
17. See also Scott v. State, 310 So. 2d 703 (Miss. 1975); Haralson v. State, 308 So. 2d 222 (Miss. 1975).
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Best known, because they receive the widest public discussion and have been
the topic of many legal seminars, are the three sets of rules largely patterned
after comparable federal rules: the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and now the Mississippi Supreme Court Rules.
Lesser known but quite significant and equally a product of the supreme court's
rule-making power are the Uniform Circuit Court Rules, the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice, the Uniform Chancery Court Rules, the
Uniform County Court Rules and the Uniform Criminal Rules of County Court
Practice.
Nevertheless, every winter, people who know better beseech the Mississippi
legislature to enact upon subjects well within the judicial power. The Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 is only one instance in which the legislature
succumbed and enacted upon a subject quite arguably beyond its legislative
authority. 1 8
Something of a bootstraps response should suffice. The Mississippi Rules of
Civil Procedure contain a rule by its terms addressing the problem of the frivolous
filing. That rule is Rule 11. Along with all other provisions of the rules, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi has declared authoritatively that Rule 11 lies within
the court's rule-making power. 19 The primary rule obligating parties and lawyers to refrain from frivolous filings, whether found in Rule 11 or the court's
inherent authority, is thus seen as valid: 2 0 valid in the sense that other parties
may of right call upon courts to enforce the rule and in the further sense that
the judges of such courts are on their oaths obligated to grant - where well
founded - such claims of right.
Our few cases construing Rule 11 assume, albeit sub silentio, that the rule
is valid. 21 After all, it is a rule regulating practice and procedure in civil actions brought in the courts of this state. As such, it is a rule within the competence of the supreme court to enact. 22 Judicial authority is not ousted by the
fact that the frivolous filing is seen as a public nuisance subject to the police
power. Not just the legislature but the entire state is vested with police powers

18. Other examples include the Child Abuse Evidence Act, see Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-403 to -415
(Supp. 1987); Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 790 n. 1 (Miss. 1988); and the Mississippi Uniform PostConviction Collateral Relief Act, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-39-1 to -29 (Supp. 1987); Reynolds v. State,
521 So. 2d 914, 915 (Miss. 1988). The latter Act begins with a blatant declaration of purpose, declaring
that it "supersedes Rule 8.07 of the Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice." Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-39-3(1) (Supp. 1987). One would-be justification of such legislative efforts merits note.
The question is put:"How else may the legislature communicate its concerns to the Court?" I answer, if formality is desired and appropriate, pass a resolution; if informality will suffice, pick up the telephone.
19. See Order Adopting The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, entered May 26, 1981, reprinted
in Mississippi RULES OF COURT 217 (1988).

20. I refer to - and accept - the concept of legal validity articulated in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 97-107 (1961).
21. Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 511 So. 2d 112, 118 (Miss. 1987).
22. By way of analogy, consider Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Affholder, Inc. v. Southern
Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305, 307-09 (5th Cir. 1984).
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within the sphere otherwise constitutionally defined for them. That being so,
the judiciary is not bound by legislative enactments within the core of the judi23
cial power.
This is not to say that the judiciary should give the back of its hand to every
legislative enactment arguably encroaching upon its rule-making turf. 24 Deference ought to be given such legislative expressions, not out of accession to
authority, but in respect for the legislature as that branch of government closest
to the people whom all branches have been created to serve. For when all is
said and done, law is not an end, but a means to the end, of a society in which
we should all want to live; and legislatures are one structure democratic theory
has devised for identifying the shape of that popularly desired society. While
the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 was well beyond legislative competence, our courts should regard the Act's provisions as aids to interpretation
of Rule 11 and, indeed, to judicial supplementation of that rule, to the extent
this may be done without violence to the integrity of Rule 11, the principles
25
embedded in it and the purposes it serves.
III.
A. The Rule Itself
Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
RULE 11. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
(a) Signature Required. Every pleading or motion of a party represented
by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented
23. Cf. Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 343 (Miss. 1987); Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain,
441 So. 2d 1329, 1345-46 (Miss. 1983).
24. For one thing, a case may be made that the quality of draftsmanship exhibited by the Litigation
Accountability Act is somewhat superior to that of Mississippi Rule 11. I say this notwithstanding that there
are several structural flaws in the Act, note of which will be taken later.
25. Our law stands in great need of the development of a general analytical framework that will guide
judicial response to legislative enactments in the field of practice and procedure. That our courts are not
obligated to enforce such statutes seems clear enough, but the problem is not so simple. I regard the comity
considerations noted above as powerful as they are legitimate. Where a court-made rule of procedure collides with a longstanding public policy pronouncement of legitimate legislative concern, we often ought to
exercise our authority in respect for the legislative declaration. City of Mound Bayou v. Roy Collins Constr.
Co., 457 So. 2d 337, 340-43 (Miss. 1984). Beyond cases of actual conflict between rule and statute (in
part the case we have here) and beyond those statutes mentioned supra note 18 - which lists only the recent
and the prominent - our law includes many other statutes regulating matters of practice and procedure in
our trial courts, matters not within the coverage of any rule of procedure. Consider, for example, our statute
regarding motions for continuances. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-123 (1972). See also Miss. UNiF. CIR. CT.
R. 2.12. There seems little likelihood that all such statutory rules of procedure will be reproduced in "rule"
form and incorporated into either the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure or the Mississippi Uniform Circuit or Chancery Court Rules at any point in the foreseeable future. We have treated such statutes as though
they "governed," that is, the statutes were allowed to furnish the rule of decision on the point of procedure
at issue. But this has been a treatment by default.
The point could be expanded. I doubt any would argue that we need to work out a coherent plan for
judicial response to such situations. The development of such an analytical framework, though arguably precedent to the present effort, must await another day.
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by an attorney shall sign his pleading or motion and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is
abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading or motion; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay.
(b) Sanctions. If a pleading or motion is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false
and the action may proceed as though the pleading or motion had not been
served. For wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous
or indecent matter is inserted. If any party files a motion or pleading which,
in the opinion of the court, is frivolous or is filed for the purpose of harassment or delay, the court may order such a party to pay to the opposing
party or parties the reasonable expenses incurred by such other parties and
by their attorneys, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

The rule is, with one significant exception, a near verbatim reproduction of
the pre-1983 version of FED. R. Civ. P. 11. 26 Former Federal Rule 11 covered
pleadings only. Mississippi Rule 11 applies to motions as well. 27 More important, the last sentence of what is codified as Mississippi Rule 11 (b) - that
authorizing assessment of fees and costs for frivolous filings - is nowhere to
be found in former Federal Rule 11.

26. Former Federal Rule 11 reads:
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The
rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony
of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent
to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may
proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if
scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
Federal court constructions of so much of this rule as is identical in wording to the Mississippi rule
should be regarded as aids to interpretation. See Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So. 2d 377, 381-82
n.2 (Miss. 1987); Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So. 2d 358, 364 n. 1 (Miss. 1983).
27. Curiously, the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 extends its coverage only to "actions" and by
its silence excludes motions. MIss. ConE ANN. § 11-55-3(c) (Supp. 1988).
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B. Interpretation of Rule 11
Our search for the meaning of Rule 11 begins with its language. 28 Much of
that language is general and open-textured. Its structure is awkward, if not inconsistent. 29 For one thing, it is not at all clear that any of the expressed liability standards in Rule I I(a) have sanction counterparts in Rule 1 (b). Careful
reading of Rule 11 (b), labeled "Sanctions," reveals as well a number of liability standards. It is not too farfetched to suggest that the last sentence of Rule
11 (b) renders the rest of the rule superfluous. Nevertheless, Rule lI's text is
and must be our ultimate referent where questions of meaning are presented,
for fidelity to law demands nothing less than that any interpretation of a legal
text first and foremost fit that text rather than some other text we may wish
had been enacted. S0
The task of interpreting any rule of law is aided considerably where the court
may identify a coherent purpose sought to be accomplished by the rule. 3 1 Yet
no notion should be resisted more strongly than that which seems so intuitively
to come to the lawyer's mind: that we should seek the intent of the lawmaker,
in this instance the rule's draftsman. To be sure, laws do not come into being
without the lawmaker(s) having some purpose in mind. But we should not and cannot - seek legal purpose by unpacking the thought process of the draftsman. 32 Legal purpose is sought in "the objective accessible world," 33 which
always begins with the language of the law. Indeed, that language is the only
place we may mine legitimately for draftsman's intent. 31
All understand generally that Rule I I has been made a part of our Rules of
Civil Procedure to empower the court to deal with the problem of the frivolous
28. For a summary of our interpretive process from another context, see Whitten & Robertson, PostCustody, Pre-Indictment Problems Of FundamentalFairnessandAccess To Counsel: Mississippi's Opportunity, 13 VT. L. REv. 247, 272-75 (1988).
29. At various points I am highly critical of the wording of Mississippi Rule 11. In fairness to the Mississippi Advisory Committee (not to be confused with the present Advisory Committee, see supra note 12)
which drafted the rule, I emphasize - and perhaps repetitiously - that the ultimate culprits by and large
were federal draftsmen. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Since one of the principal purposes of
adopting the Mississippi rules was to make uniform the rules of practice and procedure in civil cases in all
trial courts, federal and state, the advisory committee adhered to the federal wording except where there
was a substantial reason suggesting otherwise. Ordinarily I regard that as a commendable policy. Here, perhaps,
with benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, the committee's adherence to federal terminology may be a bit slavish.
30. In what I say here I have much in mind Ronald Dworkin's integrity view of law as expressed in
his LAw's EMpIR (1986). Unlike Dworkin, however, I do not exclude the positivists' notion of legal validity
nor the realists' pragmatic instrumentalism, for each in my view is a quite legitimate albeit subordinate judicial resource in deciding hard cases.
31. Per Holmes: "[A] body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is
referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end
are stated or are ready to be stated in words." Holmes, The Path Of The Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
32. In this instance, who would that draftsman be? The Mississippi Advisory Committee? The (unknown
to us) federal draftsman whose language we copied? The Supreme Court of Mississippi, which promulgated
the rules - and likely never read this particular rule?
33. Cf Thornhill v. System Fuels, Inc., 523 So. 2d 983, 1007 (Miss. 1988) (Robertson, J., concurring
in denial of petition for rehearing).
34. Cf. UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., Inc., 525 So. 2d 746, 754 (Miss. 1987).
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filing. A reading of the rule suggests that the draftsman thought there wasn't
much doubt of the rule's purpose, for, although at no point in the rule is any
particular purpose stated, the first sentence of subsection (b) authorizes the sanction of the striking of a motion or pleading if it "is signed with intent to defeat
the purpose of this rule."
In many instances the purpose of a rule of procedure may be gleaned from
the official comment. The Comment to Rule 1135 - which is in all respects
superficially written - provides: "The purposes of Rule 11 are to require that
all pleadings, motions, and papers in an action be signed . . . and to eliminate
the requirements of verified pleadings." No help is given there. In the second
paragraph of the Comment we find the sentence, "Good faith and professional
responsibility are the bases of Rule 11 ." Again, we find no aid to interpretation.
Given the text of Rule 11, the question we ought to ask is, what purpose could
best justify the promulgation of this rule? We seek no historical fact. We do
not inquire what the draftsman meant. We ask what the rule means. 36 We seek
the best statement of purpose which may justify the rule today '3 given the world
we live in.
That best statement may be far from perfect and will always fall short where
our text is as deficient as that before us today. For, as I have written elsewhere:
[Riules of law being made by man are incapable of perfection. Because
of our relative ignorance of fact and the relative indeterminacy of aim, we
make rules which include that we should wish excluded and which exclude
that we should prefer included. The judicial process should not be confused

35. The entire comment reads:
Comment
The purposes of Rule 11 are to require that all pleadings, motions, and papers in an action be signed by at least one attorney of record and to eliminate the requirements of verified
pleadings. Only the original paper must be signed, although copies served on the adverse attorneys should indicate by whom the original was signed. Counsel's office address should
appear on all pleadings and other papers. This procedure accords with Miss. Code Ann. §§
11-5-9 and 11-7-91 (1972).
Good faith and professional responsibility are the bases of Rule 11. Rule 8(b), for instance, authorizes the use of a general denial "subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11,"
meaning only when counsel can in good faith fairly deny all the averments in the adverse
pleadings should he do so. Also, a signed pleading may be introduced into evidence in another
action by an adverse party as proof of the facts alleged therein.
Verification will be the exception and not the rule to pleading in Mississippi; this is a
break from past practice. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-5-21; 11-5-29; 11-5-31; and 11-5-33
(1972). No pleading need be verified or accompanied by affidavit unless there is a specific
provision to that effect in rule or statute. See Rules 27(a) and 65.
Sham pleadings and willful violations are disciplined consistently with past Mississippi
procedure. See Sherrill v. Stewart, 197 Miss. 880, 21 So. 2d 11 (1945).
The final sentence of Rule 11(b) is intended to ensure that the trial court has sufficient
power to deal forcefully and effectively with attorneys who may intentionally misuse the liberal,
notice pleadings system effectuated by these rules.
Miss. R. Civ. P. 11 comment.
36. 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920).
37. See Mississippi Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Vaughn, 529 So. 2d 540, 542 (Miss. 1988).
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with Newton's thermodynamics or Einstein's gravity (although quantum
mechanics does present an attractive physical analogue). 38
There is no irrefutable proof we may offer that one purpose ought to be attributed to Rule 11, vanquishing all others. What is certain is that failure of
consensus regarding a dominant purpose will lead to that most unfortunate of
experiences within a legal system: varying and inconsistent interpretations and
applications of law.
These considerations lead me to avoid one type of policy statement, intuitively attractive and plentiful in the literature. I refer to that which at once extols the benefits of lawyer tenacity and virtuosity and the importance of nailing
the frivolous filer. 39 The problem with such policy statements is that they in
fact announce two policies not at all consistent with each other. The trial judge
is left trapped between the tension of such conflicting policies, with the apparent consequence quite inevitable: varying and inconsistent actions from judge
to judge, from county to county, and from case to case.
We must settle on a single purpose. Viewed in this light, at least three purposes for the rule suggest themselves: (1) punishment of attorneys and parties
who make frivolous filings; (2) compensation of victims of frivolous filings;
that is, making whole litigants who have suffered losses as a result of frivolous
filings by their adversaries; and (3) deterrence of frivolous filings. The superficial reaction is likely to be that Rule 11 serves each of these purposes and
that courts ought to interpret the rule in light of each. The superficial reaction
leads to trouble, for as anyone who has seriously thought about the law of crimes
or torts well knows, there are major tensions and inconsistencies between and
among these three purposes, and determination of which has primacy has a great
effect upon the choice of judicial action in particular cases. 1o The problem becomes acute when we realize that the rule will be given inconsistent interpretations from court to court and, indeed, from day to day, unless consensus is

38. Jones v. State, 517 So. 2d 1295, 1314 (Miss. 1987) (Robertson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
39. One of the better policy statements of this genre is found in Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), where the Court of Appeals said:
[W]e do not intend to stifle the enthusiasm or chill the creativity that is the very lifeblood
of the law. Vital changes have been wrought by those members of the bar who have dared
to challenge the received wisdom, and a rule that penalized such innovation and industry would
run counter to our notions of the common law itself. Courts must strive to avoid the wisdom
of hindsight in determining whether a pleading was valid when signed, and any and all doubts
must be resolved in favor of the signer. But where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument
can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands, Rule 11 has been violated.
762 F.2d at 254.
40. The frivolous filings problem is one that needs extensive empirical research. That research is needed
now, to identify the nature and extent of the problem. It will be needed in the future to measure Rule lI's
effectiveness and effects. Any approach to interpretation that extols multiple and inconsistent purposes will
render nightmarish the researchers' efforts - and impeach the validity of their findings.
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reached regarding Rule 1l's dominant purpose. 4 1 In the case of Federal Rule
11, there appears to be a general consensus that deterrence of frivolous filings
is the rule's primary goal.

42

My reading of Mississippi Rule 11 suggests that general deterrence of frivolous
filings is the policy that could best justify the promulgation of that rule today.
En route to judicial interpretation and application, the purpose which ought to
be attributed to Rule 11 is that of holding to a minimum the costs of frivolous
filings. 4 By "costs" I include the cost to opposing litigants who are the victims
of frivolous filings and, as well, the costs experienced by the judicial system
within which cases are litigated and by the public which ultimately pays much
of the bill. But Rule 11 is not a cost-shifting rule. Our concern is the social
cost of frivolous filings, -not the private cost. 4
The point may be put another way. Compensation and punishment theories
give the frivolous filer a choice and impliedly adopt an attitude of indifference
to how the choice is exercised. Compensation theory says to the frivolous filer
that the law does not care if he signs, files, serves and pursues a frivolous point
so long as he is willing to pay expenses incurred by the opposition. Deep pocket, hard ball litigants may in many instances calculate that the cost is worth
it. And the same of punishment theory.
Rule 11 sets standards of conduct. Compliance should not be seen as option45
al. We should not be indifferent to whether parties adhere to those standards.
A deterrent purpose ought to be attributed to Rule 11, for rational reflection
reveals that, if pursued with sensitivity and resolve, a deterrent purpose is more
likely in fact to minimize the cost of frivolous filings than either of the others.46
Of course, whatever a court does - knowingly or unintentionally, correctly
or mistakenly - will send some signal. The combined judicial stewardship (or
non-stewardship) of Mississippi's Rule 11 will generate incentives that will affect the behavior of would-be frivolous filers, for better or for worse. So seen,
why would we not seek to administer Rule 11 so that we hold the cost of frivolous
filings to a level of optimal efficiency? If efficiency so defined is the goal of
Rule 11, then interpretation necessarily must proceed upon a forward looking
utilitarianism. Punishment of offenders may be a necessary by-product, but that
41. Varying and inconsistent interpretations have been one major area of concern identified in the early
experience with the new Federal Rule 11. See Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 1015-17; Untereiner, supra note
4, at 909-12.
42. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 1020; Untereiner, supra note 4, at 907-09.
43. A reading of the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 reinforces the rejection of compensation of
victims as a goal. Section 4 of that Act lists eleven factors to be considered in fixing the amount of sanctions.
The amount of attorneys' fees and legal expenses experienced by the victim is not among those factors.
44. See R. POSNER, EcONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 7 (3d ed. 1986) ("A social cost diminishes the wealth
of society; a private cost merely rearranges that wealth."); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 1. LAW
& EcON. 1 (1960).
45. See Cuevas v. Royal D'Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 356-57 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., dissenting).
46. The deterrent purpose of Rule 11 was recognized in Canton Farm Equip., Inc. v. Richardson, 501
So. 2d 1098, 1108 (Miss. 1987).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:111

punishment should be inflicted in the form of Rule 11 sanctions only where
- and to the extent that - such may be reasonably likely to reduce the cost
of frivolous filings in the future. By the same token, compensation to frivolous
filing victims will be the necessary by-product of enforcement, but compensation should not be ordered for the purpose of making those victims whole, but
only where and to the extent necessary to deter frivolous filings in the future.
Put simply, interpretations of Rule 11 should not look to the past but to the
future. Courts enforcing Rule 11 should not concern themselves with punishing frivolous filers nor compensating their victims, but should direct their search
for such sanctions as are allowed by the rule and as may be reasonably likely
through the message sent to the bar and litigants to hold to a minimum the social cost of frivolous filings. 47 We should make no attempt to put Humpty Dumpty
back together again, but to minimize the risk of another great fall in the days
ahead.
But there are two types of deterrence: general deterrence and specific deterrence. A policy of general deterrence contemplates incentives to all would-be
frivolous filers (including the culprit for the day). Specific deterrence limits
its focus to the particular lawyer or party found to have offended Rule 11. The
best justification for Rule 11 is a policy of general deterrence. A policy of specific
deterrence would diminish our ability to reach the goal: to hold to an optimal
level the social cost of frivolous filings. It is a fly-swatter approach to a cloud
of locusts. 48 This is not to say that swatting a particularly worrisome fly does
not specifically deter that fly from future worrisome behavior and, as well, provide less tangible personal satisfactions. One-by-one specific deterrence fails
by the standard of efficiency, given general perceptions of the extent of the
frivolous filings problem.49
Three important caveats need be added. First, there is a sense - in no way
inconsistent with what has just been said - in which interpretation always mandates a backward glance. Our courts may not take any action that might deter
future frivolous filers, but only those actions that are authorized by the language of Rule 11 as promulgated on May 26, 1981. Moreover, each interpretation requires fidelity as well to the principles embedded in the precedents. 5
These are meager at the moment. That will change in time.
Second, Rule 11 is not the only rule in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Proce-

47. This is not to suggest that it is either likely (or desirable - or possible!) that other considerations
may be excluded from specific Rule 11 decisions, for I have no desire to resurrect the era of mechanical
jurisprudence. To take the extreme case, I am not quite ready to sacrifice a solo practitioner's life savings
on the altar of general deterrence.
48. That we know not how many make a cloud in this or other contexts hardly invalidates the point.
Cf. MISS. UNIF. CHAN. CT. R. 3.06.
49. Again, a plea for empirical research is in order, to the end that the future frivolous filings debate
may be a bit more sensible than that we have seen in the recent past.
50. I refer to the Dworkinian method of reading the precedents. See R. DwoRMN, supra note 30, at 225-50.
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dure. What we have said up to this point regarding the purpose of the rule contemplated that it be considered in a vacuum. As all know, Rule 11 must be
construed consistently with other rules of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. 51 Here it is important to note the general purposes of the entire body of
rules and the injunction of Rule One that: "These rules shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." The
deterrent approach to Rule 11 we have just discussed is quite consistent with
the Rule One purposes of securing the speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action. A bit of reflection suggests, however, that it may be inconsistent with the foremost purpose of the rules as announced in Rule One, securing
the just determination of every action. This fundamental point requires reflection beyond what we may give it here.
Finally, Rule 11 is not primarily a docket control rule. Case management
is only tangentially among its purposes. Rule 11 is not designed to deter numerous
filings or even the burdensome filing, but only the frivolous. To be sure, pursuit of the frivolous filing does consume judicial time and energy that could
be devoted to more legitimate litigation. In that limited sense, deterrence of
frivolous filings aids the court's time management. But the problems of crowded dockets and not enough time to dispense quality individualized justice in the
way we should like have substantial roots not causally related to the problem
of frivolous filings. The ax and shovel we need to uproot those roots may not
be found in Rule 11 or any other litigation accountability rule. Any court that
imposes a sanction upon a marginally frivolous filing, in whole or in part, to
assert control over the court's docket or to make a burgeoning caseload more
manageable, likely acts without authority in the spirit, purpose or language of
Mississippi Rule 11.
V. ACROSS THE BOARD QUESTIONS

A. The Matter of Rule 11 Coverage
Our initial question is one of coverage. What "filings" made by a party or
an attorney are subject to scrutiny under Rule 11 ? We answer this and the questions that follow by resort to the interpretative process just sketched and ultimately by reference to the language of the rule.
The first two sentences of Rule 11 (a) impose a signing requirement. Referring to the case in which a party is represented by an attorney, the first sentence requires the attorney's signature on "every pleading or motion." The signing
requirement in the second sentence of Rule 11 (a) regulates pro se litigants and
again refers to "his pleading or motion." The important certificate requirement
51. Note Miss. R. Civ. P. 8, regarded as one of the most liberal of our rules, that which fosters a regime
of notice pleading, see Stanton & Assocs., Inc. v. Bryant Constr. Co., Inc., 464 So. 2d 499, 505 (Miss.
1985), which provides expressly that it is "subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11." See Miss. R.
Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
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of Rule 11 (a) provides that the signature of the attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has "read the pleading or motion." The subsequent "good grounds"
requirement and "not interposed for delay" requirement are related to the pronoun
"it" which surely refers back to "pleading or motion."
Rule 11(a) is hardly a model of apt draftsmanship. Still there are few
interpretive problems on the question of coverage: the rule extends to "pleadings and motions."
Rule 11 (b) - which is even more confusingly worded than Rule 11 (a) begins with a reference to "a pleading or motion" which may be stricken if signed
with intent to defeat the purpose of the rule. The all-important frivolous filing
provision of the last sentence of Rule 11 (b) refers to "a motion or pleading,"
reversing the nouns without apparent reason or effect. All of this language would
seem to suggest Rule 11 coverage only of papers filed with the court that fall
within the generic categories of pleadings and motions.
The first sentence of the comment, however, suggests a broadened application of the rule to "all pleadings, motions and papers."52 The comment then
refers to "the original paper" and subsequently to "all pleadings and other papers."
53
The question raised, of course, is whether the rule would apply to "papers"
such as interrogatories, requests for production and other discovery filings. What
about requests for jury instructions? Affidavits in support of motions? Briefs?
Can the comment expand coverage beyond what may be found in the rule?
What are "pleadings" presents no special problem. Pleadings are defined by
Miss. R. Civ. P. 7(a), and certainly include the matters denominated there,
plus those substantively within Rules 8 and 9. Amendments contemplated by
Rule 15 are pleadings within Rule 11. A "motion" is by definition "an application to the court for an order."5 1 It seems safe enough to say that any other
paper filed (including a letter), asking the court to do or order something done,
should constitute a "motion" within Rule 11, whether the particular paper be
denominated formally as a motion, petition, request or perhaps not named at all.
Our larger concern is whether the rule covers all papers within the Rule 11
problem. Are there "other papers" which if frivolously filed might have the effect of unfairly hindering or delaying a party's cause, effecting harassment, or
52. Miss. R. Civ. P. 11 comment (emphasis added). This language is likened to that found in the 1983
amendment to Federal Rule II which applies to "the pleading, motion or other paper." Cf.MIss. SuP. CT.
R. 46(d), which authorizes appropriate disciplinary action against any attorney "for filing any frivolous petition, motion, brief or other paper." .
53. The Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 is quite confusing on this point. Itappears to eschew
coverage of "other papers" but lists discovery abuses among its targets. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-5(1) (Supp.
1988). The general coverage target is "action ... claim or defense." Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-5(1) (Supp.
1988). In defining the key concept "[w]ithout substantial justification," however, the Act includes "any motion." Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-3(a) (Supp. 1988). In this state of affairs the coverage language of § 11-55-5(1)
ought to control, though the point is not without doubt. To the extent that the Act excludes coverage of motions,
there is a conflict between that Act and Rule 11. I trust it is clear to all that the judiciary ought to follow
Rule 11 and ignore any such restriction in coverage emanating from the legislative enactment.
54. See Miss. R. Ctv. P. 7(b)(1).
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inflicting unnecessary expense? The answer is, perhaps so, but this would seem
largely academic, though not wholly a matter of unconcern. The matter of abusive discovery filings is not likely to be troublesome as it is subject to the sanc55
tions of Rule 37 and, hence, there is arguably no need for Rule 11 coverage.
There is no need to decide whether the frivolous or harassing brief filed in support of the motion for summary judgment is within Rule 11 coverage, for the
motion itself surely is. The motion under Rule 56(f) filed solely to delay the
inevitable is within Rule 11 coverage. But what of the similarly motivated brief
in opposition to summary judgment? Keep in mind the court's inherent power
to sanction those who substantially abuse the judicial process.5 6
The sort of papers that come most quickly to mind as those whose pursuit
is likely to cause the effects Rule 11 is designed to deter all fit easily either
within the generic "pleadings" or "motions," or are appendages of such. Though
the official comments are generally to be taken as serious interpretations of the
rules, there is here cause for pause as the comment appears to enlarge upon
the language of the rule with respect to the point of coverage. 57 Whatever gaps
may appear in the comment, an amendment to the rule, to add "and other papers"
would not seem undesirable. Still, the court's inherent authority to sanction those
who abuse the judicial process should be sufficient unto the day.
B. Rule I1's Liability Trigger
There is another question of coverage of greater practical importance: what
action (or inaction) with respect to a "pleading or motion" activates judicial
authority to inflict Rule 11 sanctions? The only verb we find in Rule 11 (a) is
"sign," stated in various tenses. The important last sentence of Rule 11 (a) refers
to the "signature" of the attorney as constituting his certificate. Rule 11 (b) again
employs the verb "sign" qualifying that with such phrases as "with intent" and
"wilful." The last word of the first sentence in Rule 11 (b) introduces a new verb,
"served," the reference obviously being to service of a pleading or motion within
Rule 5. Yet another concept appears in the third sentence regarding scandalous
and indecent matter where the verb is "is inserted," referring to the drafting

55. What of the case where counsel is assigned a file, finds in it the names of twenty witnesses, and
whips out twenty deposition notices although competent and prudent counsel would depose only three? Cf.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
56. See infra Part IV(F).
57. The status of the Comments to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure has not been clearly established. Those comments are from time to time referred to as "official comments." Pope v. Schroeder, 512
So. 2d 905, 908 (Miss. 1987); Stanton & Assocs., Inc. v. Bryant Constr. Co., Inc., 464 So. 2d 499, 505
n.6 (Miss. 1985). The court has referred to those comments as "helpful," Brown v. Credit Center, Inc.,
444 So. 2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983) and even as "normally our most valued guide to proper construction,"
Guaranty Nat'1 Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So. 2d 377, 381 (Miss. 1987). Still, on at least one occasion the
court found a comment mistaken. See First Miss. Nat'l Bank v. KLH Indus., Inc., 457 So. 2d 1333, 1336-37
(Miss. 1984).
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of the motion or pleading. Not until we reach the last sentence of Rule 11 (b)
do we find the verb "file."
Thus read, Rule 11 is again seen as a product of quite sloppy draftsmanship.
As easily drawn as this conclusion may be, we remain saddled with the task
of identifying the action(s) or inaction(s) which activates the sanction power.
Is it signing the motion or pleading? Surely not that alone, for a motion or pleading which is signed but never filed or served cannot possibly inflict costs on
either an adverse party to the litigation or upon the court. Similarly, mere insertion into a motion or pleading of "scandalous or indecent matter" may not
rationally be the object of sanctions if the pleading or motion is never filed or
served. "Service" may cause harm to a party, although a fair reading of the
rule does not support choice of this verb as that which triggers the Rule 11 sanction. Accepting our responsibility to give the rule a reading which fits its words
but is also that reading which is most coherent, we must place emphasis on
the verb "file." Rule 11 sanctions, according to the rule, may be imposed upon
the filing of a motion or pleading. More technically correct would be a requirement of "filing and . . . ," that is, filing and signing, filing and serving, filing
and inserting "scandalous or indecent matter."
This gives rise to yet another problem. The mere signing, filing and serving
of a frivolous pleading does not necessarily in fact impose more than de minimis
costs upon the opposing party or the court. Consider two familiar examples.
The plaintiff demands damages substantially in excess of any sum he reasonably expects to be able to recover. The defendant makes the boilerplate assertion in his answer that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. If the frivolous part of these filings is not pursued, there is
no harm, though there may well be a technical violation of Rule 11.58 Thought
upon this leads to the further thought that the harm, the expense and delay to
opposing litigants, the expense and consumption of time of the court, are caused
by pursuit, when the frivolous filing is signed, filed, served and pursued.
In construing the "good ground" requirement of the certificate provision of
Rule 11(a) or the "frivolous" filing provision of Rule 11 (b), many have suggested that a party and his attorney ought to be saddled with a duty of continuing inquiry. The notion is that there should come a time when a party and his
attorney have had enough time to investigate the case and obtain discovery so
as to know whether there are good grounds to support an allegation or whether
they are frivolous, and the same of legal theories. While the sanction may not
be properly imposed upon the mere filing of the motion or pleading, it certain-

58. See Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 511 So. 2d 112, 118 (Miss. 1987) (plaintiff asserted "colorable, justiciable claim" but "exaggerated" it; $3,000 attorneys' fees award made under Rule II reversed because defendant "was put to no additional expense" by plaintiffs having "exaggerat[ed] . . .her claim.").
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ly ought to be imposed if after a reasonable time it is not withdrawn, 59 or so
the argument goes.
The more sensible approach would be to provide that the sanction power be
deemed activated only when a party has pursued his frivolous filing to the point
where it has in fact imposed costs and delay upon another party or upon the
court. This sensible approach, perhaps unfortunately, is not among our options.
One reason for this is that we find within Mississippi Rule 11 no duty of diligent inquiry, much less a continuing duty. However attractive the "continuing
duty" thesis may be, our question is whether it may be found within the language of the rule, for our reading must not only be consistent with the purposes
of the rule, the best justification that may be given the rule, but also it must
fit the language of the rule. Faithful reflection reveals that "continuing duty of
inquiry" just is not there.
Similarly, candor requires concession that the language must be strained to
make Rule 11 read that its liability requirement is satisfied only when a party
pursues a frivolously filed pleading or motion. A filing plus interpretation is
mandated by the requirement of fit. As a practical matter, however, proper
stewardship of the rule in the trial courts likely will produce results consistent
with the notion of emphasis upon pursuit. Because the quantum of sanctions
is likely to be affected by the extent of harm caused in spite of our plea that
deterrence, not compensation, be our guide to interpretation, the court is likely
to have few occasions to impose sanctions for frivolous filings which have caused
no harm. This is so if for no other reason than that lawyers are not likely to
file Rule 11 motions when there is nothing to be recovered except a de minimis
sanction.
There is a more troublesome question that needs to be considered. I refer
again to the pleading or motion which is without good grounds and is frivolous
but which is not pursued by the filing party and, rather, is simply allowed to
lie in the court file. What is the result if the opposing party expends substantial
time in preparing to resist the frivolous position, when and if it is pursued, and
at some point late in or near the end of the litigation that party files a Rule 11
motion, only to be met with the response of "True, my defense of 'failure to
state a claim' was one I never had any reasonable basis for believing would
succeed, but I never pursued the point, never filed a motion for summary judgment on that ground, and never did anything to lead you to believe that I took
it seriously and, therefore, all this work you did in researching the history and
viability of a claim under Mississippi law under Section 402A of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS was a waste of time, time and effort needlessly spent, for
59. See, for example, the federal cases of Woodfork v. Gavin, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 209 (N.D. Miss.
1985); Touchstone v. G.B.Q. Corp., 1Fed. R. Serv. 3d 398, 402 (E.D. La. 1984) discussed in G. COCHRAN,
SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11214-15 (1985). See generally Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D.
189, 207-13 (1988).
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which you have no right to sanction me under Rule 11"? Surely the question
here becomes one of the reasonableness of the conduct of the party moving
for sanctions. We should be loathe to allow an interpretation of Rule 11 which
would encourage parties to take advantage of technical violations of the rule.
A party against whom a pleading or motion is filed, even where he may reasonably believe that pleading or motion is frivolous, ought to be held to an obligation to mitigate his damages. SO
C. The Idea of the Frivolous
Fundamental to our efforts this day is def'iition of the concept of the frivolous.
Assuming an imperative for consistent interpretation from county to county and
from case to case, we must elucidate "frivolous" both as a word and as a concept. We must generate standards susceptible of evenhanded application in the
hands of sensitive trial judges.
But legal frivolousness is an elusive concept. Presumably it includes the
point a party asserts with absolutely no chance of success. It certainly does not
include the "colorable, justiciable claim" which is asserted vigorously but ultimately without success. 62 We trust that no one would suggest that every litigant who suffers a directed verdict or summary judgment should be held to
have made a frivolous filing subject to Rule 11 sanctions. Not every claim or
defense dismissed or stricken as a matter of law, under Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
or otherwise, is legally frivolous. 63 The party and attorney who bring a suit
or assert a defense in defiance of existing precedent may well, as a practical
matter, have little hope of success. Yet I regard it as highly undesirable that
such parties be subject to Rule 11 sanctions."
A brief review of recent Mississippi legal history should make the point. Should
the plaintiff and attorney, who before Burns v. Burns65 challenged interspousal
tort immunity, have been hit with Rule 11 sanctions? Should the plaintiff and

60. Compare the approach taken under new Federal Rule 11. Untereiner, supra note 4, at 918.
61. U.S. District Judge William W. Schwarzer has suggested that any attempt to define frivolousness
so that one could "predict with some certainty whether a claim is ... beyond the pale ... would be disingenuous." Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 1018.
62. Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 511 So. 2d 112, 118 (Miss. 1987).
63. We see no tension in the modified notice pleading practice sanctioned by Rules 8 and 9. See Stanton
& Assocs., Inc. v. Bryant Constr. Co., Inc., 464 So. 2d 499, 504-06 (Miss. 1985). We say this in light
of the absence of any diligent inquiry requirement in Rule 11(a) and of the more important fact that frivolousness
is an objective concept, not a subjective one.
64. The Litigation Accountability Act lists among the factors that should be considered "in determining
whether to assess [sanctions] . ..and the amount to be assessed":
The extent to which any action, claim or defense was asserted by an attorney or party in a
good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law in this state which purpose was made known
to the court at the time of filing ....
MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7(g) (Supp. 1988). Assuming an objective reading of "good faith," I find it hard
to imagine a case fitting this definition that should not be immunized from sanctions, without regard to any
advance notice to the court.
65. 518 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1988).
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attorney who challenged the second accident doctrine prior to Toliver v. General
Motors Corp.66 have had to proceed in fear of Rule 11 sanctions? Should the
67
plaintiff and attorney who attacked the locality rule prior to Hall v. Hilbun
have been subjected to monetary sanctions and penalties? What now of the party
who challenges our employment at will doctrine68 or the party who demands
emotional distress damages where there has been no impact or objective physical injury? 69 I would answer all of these in the negative.
A special problem lurks in the world of the factually frivolous. I refer to the
case where one's adversary is in exclusive possession and control of the facts.
Consider the wrongful death case where all of the witnesses are under defendant's control, as in Jones Act or FELA cases, 7a or perhaps where there are
no eyewitnesses at all. What about the products liability claim, particularly one
alleging defective design? An early asbestosis case? Without extensive discovery and skillful cross-examination, the plaintiff is often quite helpless to make
his case. Yet he must file a complaint - without really knowing whether he
can prove his case - in order to obtain some legally enforceable means of requiring the defendant to submit to discovery.
The pleader is caught in a catch 22. Discovery is limited to matters relevant
"to the issues raised by the claims or defenses of any party."71 If he doesn't
sign and file a pleading alleging the point, he may not compel his adversary
to submit to discovery regarding it. When he makes the filing, however, he
runs the risk that discovery may yield a dry hole followed by Rule 11 sanctions. I am loathe to say there is no hope of success in such a case, or more
to the point, that such filers ought to be subject to Rule 11 sanctions. 72 Particularly is this so where the party has not pursued the claim past the point where
there appears nothing further would be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence that would support the claim.
Our concern is with the filing that falls below that minimum level at which
all lawyers are expected to perform. We are talking about legal malpractice,
a filing so deficient that the fee-paying client would of right be entitled to her
money back. A pleading or motion borders on the frivolous when it would not
receive at least a "C" from the law professor's grading pen. We refer, of course,
66. 482 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1985).
67. 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
68. See Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086 (Miss. 1987); Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.
2d 247 (Miss. 1985).
69. See First Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324, 329 (Miss. 1975). But see R. DWORKIN, supra
note 30, at 225-50.
70. State courts have subject matter jurisdiction of Jones Act or FELA cases concurrent with that of
the federal courts. See Penrod Drilling Co. v. Bounds, 433 So. 2d 916, 928-29 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson,
J., concurring).
71. Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
72. The Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 lists, among the factors to be considered in determining
whether to sanction, and how much, "[tihe availability of facts to assist in determining the validity of an
action, claim or defense." Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7(c) (Supp. 1988).
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far more to the substance than to the form of the lawyer's product. The rules'
modified notice pleading policy mandates such.
In my view a "no hope of success" definition of the frivolous is most consistent with the language and purposes of the rule. 73 That definition should apply
to the legally frivolous and, as well, the factually frivolous. No doubt such a
definition admits of no precise boundaries. There will always be borderline cases
some trial judges will find frivolous, others not. 7 I trust all would find frivolous
a defamation suit filed three years after the defendant's utterance in the face
of a one-year statute of limitations. 75 Or the defendant who argues that contributory negligence bars the plaintiff's action 76 or who pleads as a defense lack
of privity of contract. 77 And, as well, the plaintiff whose contract claim is clearly
barred by the statute of frauds. Also without objective hope of success - and
thus legally frivolous - would be a defendant's denial that a manufacturer defendant could be held liable absent plaintiff's proof of fault7 8 or a plaintiff's denial
that the court had authority to entertain defendant's motion for summary judgment.

79

The Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 offers standards labeled differently, and perhaps misleadingly. Actions are frivolous if brought "without substantial justification."80 These words connote a harsher standard than that I prefer.
Surprisingly, however, "without substantial justification" is defined to mean
"frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or vexatious." 81 The definition is preferable to the label and not wholly consonant with it. The trouble area with the
liability standard of the Act is found in the list of eleven factors courts are mandated to consider "in determining whether to assess [sanctions] . . . and the

amount to be assessed." 8 2 Courts deciding sanctions motions with these standards on the table are, it seems to me, almost certain to impose sanctions in
many cases where there was a reasonable hope of success. The factor list in
section 11-55-7, about which I will say more below, seems quite capable of
generating a de facto liability standard even tougher than that found in post-1983
Federal Rule 11. The potential for over-deterrence seems great, for that stan-

73. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit calls it an "absolutely no chance of success" and "no reasonable argument" standard. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243,
254 (2d Cir. 1985).
74. See S. KASSIM, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS (Federal Judicial Center 1985), cited
in Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 1016 n.15.
75. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-35 (1972).
76. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972).
77. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1987).
78. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966). Is the result different if defense
counsel applies great diligence and scholarship to the preparation of the brief arguing that Mississippi made
a horrendous mistake in adopting Section 402A of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS? I think not.
79. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56; Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1983).
80. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-5(1) and (4) (Supp. 1988).
81. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-55-3(a) (Supp. 1988).

82. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7 (Supp. 1988).
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dard will, if enforced, almost certainly deter filings, not just frivolous filings.
Because it is incompatible with the best reading that may be given Rule 11,
the Litigation Accountability Act standard should be disregarded.
Another general point regarding the Mississippi Rule 11 notion of the frivolous
must be noted, for it is wholly at odds with post-1983 Federal Rule 11. No
requirement of diligent inquiry is imposed, 8 3 nor does our Rule 11 recognize
proof of diligent inquiry as a defense to a frivolous filing."
This is more than a matter of linguistic choice. Two fundamentally different
options are presented to the interpreter of Rule 1l's liability trigger. Are we
concerned with the conduct of parties and their attorneys or their product? Both
are objective standards - that type standard suggested by the best reading and
justification we may give (most of) Rule 11. As before, selecting one as the
preferred standard is vital to our goal of consistent interpretations.
We return to the rule's purpose: to hold to an optimal level the social costs
of frivolous filings. What causes those costs: parties'/attorneys' conduct or their
product, for that cause is what we should rationally seek to deter? The question
answers itself. That a(n objectively) frivolous pleading or motion is filed and
pursued is what inflicts costs. No matter that the attorney spent a hundred hours
or one hour in preparation for the filing, the social cost of that frivolous filing
will remain unchanged.
A product standard fits the language of Rule 11. Consider first, the last sentence of Rule 11 (a), the "certificate" rule. An attorney's signature on a pleading
or motion constitutes his certificate that "to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it." Conspicuously absent is
"after diligent inquiry" or other like words. 85 The rule suggests a duty of objective reflection on what is known, and a duty of reasonable conclusions. The
certificate rule is not offended if a minimally competent attorney, knowing what
was then known, would think it supported by "good ground," notwithstanding
that he has not bestirred himself to find out.
a
Conversely, all the diligence in the world is no defense to the filing of
86
frivolous pleading or motion contrary to the last sentence of Rule 11 (b).
D. The Timing of the Frivolous Filing
There is a related question. At what point in the life of a civil action is frivolousness determined? A variety of scenarios leap to mind. The plaintiff files a com-

83. Contrast federal practice. See Vairo, supra note 59, at 205-20.
84. The Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 suggests an inquiry test. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7(a)
and (i) (Supp. 1988).
85. Federal Rule 11 now reads "after reasonable inquiry."
86. There are features of a conduct standard that are attractive. Punishing one who has tried hard goes
against the grain. Some say a conduct standard is easier to insulate from judicial abuse of the sort some
perceive in the federal courts. The problems are that a conduct standard, even when objectively administered,
fails to strike the perceived evil and fails to fit the language of the rule.
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plaint at a time when, on the basis of the information then collectively available
to all concerned, he had no hope of success, only six months later to discover
a bush witness who makes the claim. Or, suppose that at the time of filing,
defendant has substantial control of the evidence on liability, e.g., a defective
design case, and at the time of filing plaintiff has no way of knowing whether
he can make out a jury issue. These situations and others that may readily be
imagined suggest that the objective assessment of frivolousness be made on the
basis of all that is known or has been known to all parties and the court at or
prior to the time the Rule 11 motion is ruled upon. That the plaintiff had no
objectively reasonable hope of success at the time he filed his complaint should
never be the test. Nor should the Rule 11 court consider that the claim (or defense)
in fact did not prevail at trial or otherwise. The question should be whether,
at the time the Rule 11 motion is ruled on, and based on what by then has become known, there was an objective basis for believing that the claim had a
chance of success.
The reason for this approach to timing is found in the rule's deterrent purpose. It is the frivolous filing we wish to stop. Rule 11 is not designed to end
sloppy lawyering or to reduce lawyer procrastination. We have other means
to those ends. To the point, I see no articulable reason why the claim or defense,
seen with objectively reasonable hope of success after all has come to light,
should be labeled frivolous just because the lawyer or party didn't know it wasn't
frivolous at the time of filing. By the same token, I see no end based on fairness that would be served by holding such a claim or defense under Rule 11.
In the emotionally charged area of bad faith refusal litigation, it has never
made sense to me that we should sanction an insurance company, where an
objectively reasonable basis existed for refusal to pay a claim. That the insurer
did not know of that arguable reason at the time of denial of the claim has always struck me as logically irrelevant - if in fact the objectively arguable rea87
son existed.
E. The DiscretionaryNature of the Authority to Sanction
Another source of concern and confusion about the potency of Mississippi
Rule 11 emanates from the discretionary nature of the sanctioning authority
vested in the trial courts. Each statement of authority to penalize found in Rule
11 (b) includes the word "may." Certain pleadings "may be stricken." Attorneys
"may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action." "[T]he court may order . . .[payment of] reasonable expenses . . . ." All of this is in contrast with
the most celebrated feature of the new Federal Rule 11 and the inclusion there-

87. Cf.Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 273 (Miss. 1985). The fact that,
due to negligent investigation or whatever, an insurer did not know of the arguable reason it may have for
refusal to pay timely a claim, cannot proximately cause any legally cognizable damage the insured may suffer.
The same rationale applies here.
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in of the mandatory "shall." 8 This has led many federal courts to say that, upon
finding of a violation of the liability standards of Rule 11, sanctions must be
imposed8 9 and in saying so to think they have said something important. For
example, the Fifth Circuit has recently written: "There are no longer any 'free
passes' for attorneys and litigants who violate Rule 11. Once a violation of Rule
11 is established, the rule mandates the application of sanctions." 90
It takes but two seconds' thought to realize that new Federal Rule 11 is just
as discretionary as its pre-1983 version and anyone who thinks otherwise seems
a likely candidate to purchase stock in the company I am organizing to build
a new bridge across the Yoknapatawpa River. 91 In cases where, under pre-1983
Rule 11, the district court would not be inclined to impose sanctions, the court
today will merely find that there is no violation in the first place. Federal Rule
1l's requirements that attorneys make "reasonable inquiry" and that their pleadings
be "well-grounded in fact," etc. are quite open-textured and necessarily vest
in any district court caring to use it enormous discretion with virtual immunity
from reversal if that discretion is exercised discreetly. Furthermore, finding
a violation of Rule 11 merely mandates the imposition of some sanction, and
federal judges are then given broad authority to select just what sanction should
92
be imposed and as well to modulate its severity.
What has happened in the federal system is not that Federal Rule 11 has adopted
a mandatory standard, but that a strong message has been given from the Rules
Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court in promulgating the 1983 amendments that Rule 11 is to be taken seriously. It is not so much the new language
that has wrought the explosion of Rule 11 litigation in the federal courts - that
language, as explained, is as susceptible of discretionary interpretations as the
old. What is new is the sub silentio "and we really meant it" behind Federal
Rule 11.
The point for the moment, of course, is that there is no reason to think Mississippi's Rule 11 is in any significant way different from Federal Rule 11 with
regard to the discretionary authority vested in trial courts. Yet before Mississippi's trial judges embolden themselves and begin imposing sanctions under
Rule 11 with greater frequency and severity, we had best be sensitive to the

88. The Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 also uses the mandatory "shall." Miss. CODE ANN. §
11-55-5(1) and (3) (Supp. 1988).
89. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 876 (5th Cir. 1988).
90. Thomas, 836 F.2d at 876.
91. Discretionaryimposition of sanctions would be further guaranteed were we to embark upon a regime of enforcement of the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988. I refer to a structural defect in that Act.
Section 3 contains the mandatory "shall," as explained above. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-5(1) and (3) (Supp.
1988). Section 4, however, itemizes eleven factors which courts are charged to consider "among others,
in determining whether to ... [impose sanctions]." Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7 (Supp. 1988) (emphasis
added). This is another reason why the Mississippi judiciary should make no attempt to enforce the mandatory sanctions concept of the Act. Because of the discretionary language of Section 4, we can't.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
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federal experience and particularly to the massive problem of satellite litigation. Rule lI's efficiency purpose will hardly be served if litigants and courts
become involved in extensive and unproductive litigation regarding the meaning and enforcement of Rule 11, for such will only increase, not decrease, the
cost of litigation.
F. The Extra-Rule 11, Inherent Authority to Sanction
Abuse of the Judicial Process
We have taken several swipes at the draftsmanship of Rule 11 - and there
are more to come. In this context we regard it quite important to recognize that
Rule 11 is by no means the exclusive source of authority for courts, and in
particular trial courts, to impose sanctions upon attorneys who make frivolous
filings. We have alluded elsewhere to the court's inherent powers. The point
should be fleshed out a bit.
Courts of this state have always been regarded as having the inherent power
to regulate the conduct of the officers who appear before them and to impose
sanctions where appropriate, notwithstanding absence of statute or rule.9 3 When
attorneys violate rules of practice, courts of this state have the inherent authority
to impose monetary fines or sanctions, though there be no written rule expressly authorizing same."4 The authority extends to and includes imposing nonmonetary sanctions as well. Against this backdrop, drafting deficiencies, such
as the absence of the word "attorney" in the last sentence of Rule 11(b), are
seen as no obstacle to the court's authority to impose monetary sanctions upon
attorneys who make frivolous filings or filings for the purpose of harassment
or delay.
V.

THE RULE

11

CERTIFICATE

The last sentence of Rule 11(a) reads: "The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading or motion; that to the
93. See Bramlett v. Burgin, 382 So. 2d 284, 285 (Miss. 1979); In re Fox, 296 So. 2d 701,702 (Miss. 1974).
94. See Allison v. State, 436 So. 2d 792, 796 (Miss. 1983); Scott v. State, 310 So. 2d 703, 706 (Miss.
1975). But see Aeroglide Corp. v. Whitehead, 433 So. 2d 952 (Miss. 1983). Some federal courts recognized
that attorneys' fees and costs could be awarded under pre-1983 Federal Rule 11. For example, in Driscoll
v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 174, 175 (N.D. 111.1980), the court found that attorneys' fees
may be awarded in the exercise of its "inherent power" under Rule 11. See also Badillo v. Central Steel
& Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1983) (attorneys' fees may be an appropriate sanction under
Rule 11); Hedison Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1981) (frivolous nature of contentions
made award of counsel fees and expenses appropriate); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677 (9th
Cir. 1980) (attorney sanctioned for having abused court's process); Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board
of Governors, 548 F. Supp. 157, 160 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (Rule 11 "corroborates" authority to impose attorneys' fees for abuses of judicial process); LeGare v. University of Pa. Medical School, 488 F. Supp. 1250,
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (motion for costs and fees denied because too early in the litigation "to make informed
judgments as to whether the action is groundless"); Textor v. Board of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 37 Fed.
R. Serv. 2d 291, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1983) (monetary sanctions may be awarded, but only after a hearing;
burden of proof on party seeking the award). Aeroglide is incorrect insofar as it suggests lack of authority.
The opinion should have held that the trial court abused the discretionary authority it undoubtedly possesses.
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best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay."
These words begin to supply the substance reflected in the familiar idea of
the Rule 11 certificate. They are taken verbatim from pre-1983 Federal Rule
11, except that "pleading" has been expanded into "pleading or motion." The
sentence gives meaning to the signature requirement, which precedes it.
When an attorney signs a pleading or motion, he is acting in his capacity
as an officer of the court and is making three substantive representations. The
first of these is often overlooked: "that he has read" it. Yet few familiar with
big firm law practice can be unaware that not infrequently lawyers sign and
95
have filed pleadings and motions they have not read.
Second, the attorney's signature represents to the court "that to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it." This
is the duty of objectively reasonable reflection mentioned above. We have already rejected the idea that this language includes any requirement of diligent
inquiry. We recognize that such a notion may be found trailing around in some
of the pre-1983 federal cases. We reject it because it does not appear in the
language of the rule. A reading that would require diligent or reasonable inquiry simply does not fit the text we interpret.
Good reasons become apparent as to why a diligent inquiry principle would
not be desirable. The extent to which lawyers have opportunity to inquire varies
radically with the case. The wrongful death plaintiff's counsel may have no
one to inquire of. Other counsel may have dozens or hundreds of potential witnesses available. The statute of limitations may be about to run, leaving one
no time to inquire. More significantly, diligent inquiry standards run the risk
of importing subjectivity into the rule. It may divert our attention from the objective question whether a filing is frivolous, for it is the frivolous filing that
imposes costs upon opposing parties and the court, and the experience of such
costs often has nothing to do with the extent of pre-filing or post-filing inquiry.
A diligent inquiry standard would often penalize the competent lawyer while
exonerating the dullard.
The third representation the lawyer makes when he signs the pleading or motion
is that "it is not interposed for delay." We consider this to encompass the filing
made for the dominant purpose of delay and where an objective assessment
of the circumstances immediately preceding filing would not lead a minimally
competent lawyer to believe some delay is needed in the legitimate interest of
his client. At the very least the word "delay" in the rule should be read "unnecessary delay" or "unjustifiable delay."
The principal difficulty with the certificate requirement of Rule 1 (a) is the

95. 1 am reminded of the storm President Carter generated when, upon taking office in 1977, he ordered
that department heads read all regulations promulgated under their names.
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lack of an express sanction. There is no other provision of the rule adequately
empowering courts to impose a sanction upon attorneys who make a false certificate. The second sentence of Rule 11 (b) authorizes a sanction for wilful violation, again generating the subjectivity problem. Besides, few members of the
bar are unable to come up with some sort of a half-baked justification for a
challenged filing, sufficient to avoid a "wilful" finding. All of this inevitably
causes the thought that the Rule 11 (a) certificate imposes little more than a moral
obligation.
I do not take such a view. Instead, the Rule 11 (a) certificate requirement ought
to be read in the light of the court's inherent authority to impose sanctions upon
attorneys who abuse the machinery of justice. Filing a pleading or motion knowing that there are no grounds to support it, or filing where a major purpose
is delay and without objective belief that delay is needed in the interest of justice,
is an abuse of the machinery. As explained above, the court has authority to
protect itself and its legitimate litigants in the face of such, notwithstanding that
explicit authority may not be found in Rule 11.
VI.

THE SANCTIONS PART OF RULE

11

Our primary concern is ascribing meaning to the sanctions provisions of Rule
11, those found in Rule 11 (b). We say this, sensitive to the oft-expressed observation that post-1983 Rule 11 litigation in the federal courts has yielded significantly inconsistent and varying interpretations, both on "liability" and sanctions
issues, from district to district and from day to day.9 6 Suffice it to say that our
goal ought to be a reading of Rule 11, and particularly of Rule 11 (b), that is
the same in the Circuit Court of Tishomingo County as in the Chancery Court
of Wilkinson County.
Yet there is a tension tugging against consistency in interpretation. The approach to interpretation that is adequate to deter violations by parties and litigants operating on a contingency fee basis may be quite different from that
adequate in hourly rate cases. And what about fixed fee litigation? Minimal
fee cases, such as many domestic relations cases?
Beyond that, there are a variety of types of action which may be filed in the
courts of this state where because of legislative enactment, plaintiffs may have
attorneys' fees assessed to defendant in the event the plaintiff succeeds. The
purpose of these fee shifting statutes has in substantial part been to remove economic deterrents to the bringing of lawsuits of these types. Enforcement of Rule
11 sanctions against plaintiffs in these types of cases may well run counter to
the statutory purposes of encouragement of these types of litigation. Beyond
all of this, we can say without fear of contradiction that Rule 11 (b) is one of
the most poorly drafted provisions in the entire Mississippi Rules of Civil Proce96. Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 1015-17.
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dure and we can easily see how construction might be regarded by many as
a veritable nightmare.
These concerns on the table before us, we will suggest an appropriate construction of Rule 11 (b). We begin by recognizing that the rule has four separate
provisions which authorize the imposition of sanctions. But that is not all they
do. They contain liability standards as well, some of which dwarf those of Rule
1 1(a), with the possible exception of the Rule 11 certificate. Rule 11 (b) consists of four separate unnumbered sentences. Little consistency may be found
from one to the others in form, wording or concept. Still, three questions can
and must be asked - and answered - in the case of each subpart of Rule 11 (b):
What sort of conduct constitutes a violation? Against whom may a sanction be
imposed - the party or the attorney or both? What sanction may be imposed,
including what type of sanction and with what severity? We approach these questions against the backdrop of the general considerations outlined in Section III
above.
A. The Frivolous Filing Made with Intent...
The first unnumbered sentence of Rule 11 (b) reads: "If a pleading or motion
is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may
be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading or motion had not been served."
1. What Is the Liability Standard?
This sentence actually contains two primary rules of obligation. First, a pleading or motion must be signed. Failure to sign is a violation. Common sense
suggests, of course, that if the failure to sign is inadvertent or accidental, the
party or the attorney should be given a reasonable opportunity to sign it. 97
The more difficult liability standard is the second one, for there is a violation
if a pleading or motion is signed "with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule."
The phrase "this rule" no doubt refers to the entire Rule 11. But as noted above,
the rule contains no statement of purpose. Rather, purpose must be derived and,
as explained above, we have identified the dominant purpose of the rule as a
utilitarian one: general deterrence of frivolous filings.
What meaning then should be ascribed to the phrase "signed with intent to
defeat . . . ."? Should intent be read subjectively or objectively? Are we concerned with the pleader's or movant's actual state of mind - and, if so, at what
point in time; or are we concerned with what he reasonably ought to have known
had he thought about the matter, taking the standard of reasonableness from
the average person standing in the shoes of the movant or pleader, be he lay
litigant, country lawyer, or highly experienced and specialized litigator? Either
97. The Federal Rule provides: "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant."
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approach fits the language of the rule. We know from experience that every
lawyer is capable of convincing himself of the legitimacy of practically any proposition imaginable. For this reason a subjective intent standard simply won't work.
Practical reality dictates that the intent standard must be an objective one.
Any attempt to ascribe a subjective meaning will likely result in courts reading
the rule objectively, holding lawyers to account for filings they reasonably ought
to have known were frivolous. Beyond that, inquiries into what was actually
in the mind of the movant or pleader seem far more likely to lead to ad hoc
results from case to case and from county to county and, as well, to disserve
the purpose of providing deterrence for frivolous filings.
Having in mind what has been said above, the liability standard of the first
sentence of Rule 11 (b) should read as follows: "If a pleading is signed, filed,
served and pursued with objective intent to undermine the purpose of the rule,
to-wit: deterrence of frivolous filings .....
2. Against Whom May the Sanction Be Imposed?
The sanction is imposed against the party. The remainder of the sentence limits
the form of sanction to striking the motion or pleading. Common sense suggests that such an action is a direct sanction only against the party. The attorney isn't hurt when the pleading is stricken; the party is.
Of course, an attorney who files a motion or pleading, without complicity
on the part of the client, in violation of the liability standards of the first sentence of Rule 11 (b), only to find it stricken by the court, may well find himself
a defendant in a legal malpractice action.
3. What Sanction May Be Imposed?
The only sanction authorized is striking the pleading or motion. 98 In one of
the few clear provisions of Rule 11 (b) we find the language "and the action
may proceed as though the pleading or motion had not been served." The words
"sham and false" are meaningless at best and confusing at worst, and should
be deleted from the rule as soon as possible, and until then ignored.
B. The Wilful Violation Rule
The second sentence of Rule 11 (b) reads: "For wilful violation of this rule
an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action."
1. What Is the Liability Standard?
The liability standard here refers to the entire rule and speaks of a "wilful
violation." The juxtaposition of this language with the rest of the rule precludes
our preference for objective standards and instead mandates a subjective stan98. Striking a party's pleading is a sanction also authorized for violation of our discovery rules and may
result in dismissal of the lawsuit altogether. See Williams v. Puryear, 515 So. 2d 1231 (Miss. 1987).
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dard, not an objective one. Limiting the individual upon whom sanctions may
be imposed to the attorney, again in proper context imports a subjective standard. An attorney offends this standard when he knowingly and deliberately
files a pleading or motion for the purposes of delay, when he knowingly or
deliberately files a motion or pleading which he in fact knows is frivolous, or
when he knowingly and deliberately files a motion or pleading for the purpose
of harassing another party and imposing unreasonable expense upon him.
2. Against Whom May the Sanction Be Imposed?
The person against whom sanctions may be imposed is limited to the attorney.
3. What Sanction May Be Imposed?
Here we confront the one sentence of Rule 11 that suggests a purpose other
than deterrence. The liability standard connotes improper purpose as that which
offends the rule. "[D]isciplinary action" is authorized, which again imports a
punitive purpose. This combined with the subjective wilfulness test relegates
to by-product status our generally applicable general deterrence rationale for
the rule.
The sanction authorized is "appropriate disciplinary action." This phrase should
be construed to include all sanctions that a court has power to take against any
attorney for misconduct in the course of litigation. Possible sanctions certainly
include imposition of monetary penalties and, in the event of extreme violations, imprisonment. 99 Lesser non-monetary sanctions are available as well.
The trial court certainly has discretionary authority, in addition to or in lieu
of judicial sanctions, to refer the matter to the Complaints Committee of the
Mississippi State Bar for disciplinary action.
C. Scandalous Or Indecent Matter
The third sentence of Rule 11 (b) reads: "Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted." Interpretation regarding the parties against
whom the sanction may be imposed and the nature and extent of the sanction
obviously are the same as those in the case of the second provision just discussed. The liability standard, however, is more problematical, for the words
"scandalous or indecent matter" are quite vague and susceptible of varying interpretations. These are words with respect to which the core of certainty of
their meaning is small and the penumbra of doubt is great. Courts should be

99. Such a proceeding would be one for criminal contempt, vesting the attorney with the familiar panoply of procedural safeguards. See Culpepper v. State, 516 So. 2d 485 (Miss. 1987); Cook v. State, 483
So. 2d 371, 374 (Miss. 1986).
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slow to invoke this standard for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. 10o
D. The Frivolous Filing - and the One Made for Harassment or Delay
By far the most important sanctioning provision of Rule 11 (b) - arguably
the most important sentence in the entire rule - is found in the last unnumbered sentence which reads:
If any party files a motion or pleading which, in the opinion of the court,
is frivolous or is filed for the purpose of harassment or delay, the court
may order such a party to pay to the opposing party or parties the reasonable expenses incurred by such other parties and by their attorneys, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
This sentence, it will be recalled, was not a part of pre-1983 Federal Rule 11
and was added independently by the draftsman of Mississippi Rule 11.
1. What Is the Liability Standard?
The liability standard of this rule may be read to subsume that found in the
first sentence of Rule 11 (b) and, as well, the obligation imposed in the certificate sentence of Rule 11 (a). Indeed, persuasive argument can be made that the
only provision of the entire Rule 11 not rendered moot or redundant by this
last sentence is that found in the second sentence of Rule 11 (b), the sentence
authorizing "appropriate disciplinary action against attorneys for 'wilful violations."' As noted above, this latter provision is the only one that talks of subjectively wilful violations. The last sentence regarding frivolous filings and
harassment or delay in no way requires that the conduct has been wilful.
The first point apparent in the language here under scrutiny is that we are
again concerned with an objective standard. Proscribed are motions or pleadings which "in the opinion of the court" are "frivolous" or are "filed for the purpose of harassment or delay." If the court applying an objective test of
frivolousness or harassment or delay finds a violation, that is all that is necessary to authorize imposition of the sanction. On the question of frivolousness,
the point is conceptually easy. The court looks at the paper challenged under
Rule 11 and, applying the no-hope-of-success standard discussed above, decides whether it is frivolous. Inquiry regarding the subjective intent or motivation or reasonable belief of either the party or his attorney is simply not germane.
The best reading of the "for the purpose of harassment or delay" prong also
connotes an objective test. A pleading or motion is filed for the purpose of harassment or delay if the party or attorney knew or reasonably should have known
100. See Wheat v. Eakin, 491 So. 2d 523 (Miss. 1986). A pro se pleader employed rather earthy language in denying plaintiff's claim. The court's suggestion, "If an attorney had used such language in a pleading to the court, he would have been subject to discipline," 491 So. 2d at 526, is arguably correct, though
it shows a marked lack of a sense of humor. We have no law proscribing such in the conduct of attorneys,
only a long tradition to that effect.
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that it would have the effect of harassment or delay. Reasonably should have
known, of course, is a standard having reference to others similarly situated
- lay litigants, country lawyers and big fimn specialists. The question is whether
the party sought to be sanctioned, having in mind his level of experience and
understanding, reasonably should have known that the filing would harass a
party or unfairly delay his cause. 101
The more important question is whether a filing may trigger the court's authority to sanction when it is "filed for the purpose of harassment or delay" but when,
applying the test of frivolousness described above, the court cannot say that
it is frivolous. Fidelity to text answers in the affirmative, as the disjunctive "or"
lies unmistakably in the language. The sanction may be imposed in either event
- the filing of a motion or pleading which is frivolous or one which is filed
for the purpose of harassment or delay.
But what policy consideration might lead a lawmaker to create a law that would
sanction a filing that is not frivolous, even though objectively for harassment
or delay purposes? As long as the filing is not frivolous, should not the adversary system give equal rein to each litigant to seek tactical advantage through
harassment or delay? 102 One can think of dozens of types of non-frivolous filings our law allows, even encourages, even though such will surely have the
effect of harassment or delay - ranging from motions for summary judgment
to discovery to post-trial motions.
Returning to our derivation of a deterrent purpose for Mississippi Rule 11
- holding the cost of litigation to an optimally efficient level - one type of
motion suggests itself as a most eligible candidate for sanctions when filed for
harassment or delay, even when non-frivolous. I refer to the motion for sanctions itself, whether filed under Miss. R. Civ. P. 37, or even under Rule 11. 103
In the first place, such motions are "motions" within the coverage of Rule 11
and particularly the last sentence of Rule 1 l(b). More substantial is the reality
that motions for sanctions are at best satellite litigation, time-consuming, expensive and bitterly contested, and often contribute little or nothing to the ultimate just determination of the civil action. Satellite litigation absorbs the resources
and energies of the judiciary as well as the litigants. There is special reason
to deter it, even when meritorious.
There is a special sort of Rule 11 motion that should be scrutinized with care
under Rule 1I(b)'s "purpose of harassment" standard. The context has been noted
101. This standard is a loose functional equivalent of the standard conceptualized in Hall v. Hilbun, 466
So. 2d 856, 871-73 (Miss. 1985) and applied to physicians in medical malpractice cases.
102. This is as good a point as any to emphasize that nothing said anywhere herein should be read as
a retreat from my strongly held views regarding the zeal with which an attorney is obligated to advocate
his client's cause, see Robertson, The Lawyer As Hero, 53 Miss. L.J. 431 (1983), only that courts are not
always obligated to let lawyers get away with all that the lawyer may be obligated to do.
103. See Canton Farm Equip., Inc. v. Richardson, 501 So. 2d 1098, 1109 n.12 (Miss. 1987). The motion for costs under Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(h) is also the type of motion susceptible of treatment as suggested
above in the case of Miss. R. Civ. P. 11 and 37.
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in Part IV(C) above: all of the evidence is under the control of one's adversary,
usually a defendant, e.g., in a wrongful death or products liability case. Not
infrequently, as a matter of hard-nosed pre-trial tactics, such a defendant will
simultaneously pursue his Rule 11 motion on grounds that plaintiffs claim is
frivolous and at once resist all meaningful discovery, thus implicity acknowledging that the claim is not frivolous. Perhaps withdrawal of objections to discovery ought to be made a pre-condition to the Rule 11 motion, though I am not
for the moment prepared to go so far. What is apparent is that simultaneous
objection to discovery and pursuit of a Rule 11 motion for sanctions suggests
a purpose of harassment itself worthy of a stinging response.
The adversary system being what it is, few lawyers and litigants can resist
an opportunity to bring pressure to bear upon the opposition. Sanction motions,
under Rule 37 or under Rule 11, can be most potent tools to this end. The hardnosed adversary can use Rules 37 and 11 to divert the opposition's time and
attention from other matters, to inflict expense and, through the certainty that
such motions must be resisted and the possibility that such motions might succeed, to chill the adversary's zeal for the case. For better or for worse, the civil
action today is rare where at some point some litigant does not try to exact sanctions of some sort from the other.
Without fear of contradiction, I suggest that often these motions for sanctions are frivolous, but even where non-frivolous, they are often in substantial
part for harassment or delay. Lawyers should be made to "stop and think" before moving for sanctions under Rule 37 or Rule 11.
Here the federal experience has much to teach us. Consensus abounds that
post-1983 Federal Rule 11 has given off incentives to litigants to engage in satellite litigation. Whether these incentives emanate from the language of the new
rule or from apocryphal warnings Professor Arthur Miller gave rebellious students at the Harvard Law School more than a decade ago, they are there. The
most often identified problem with new Federal Rule 11 is the sheer quantity
of satellite litigation it has generated, with its attendant consumption and waste
of judicial and litigant resources.
To date few have received such incentives from Mississippi's Rule 11. Whether
this is for some or all of the reasons mentioned at the outset, or simply because
the rule has been on the books for only a few years, I do not know. What is
important is that we still have the chance - and the challenge - to bring our
baby up right. Sensitive enforcement of Rule 11 against motions for sanctions
under Rules 37 and 11, where a substantial purpose of such is harassment or
delay, just may in the long run keep Mississippi's judiciary out of the satellite
litigation swamp.
A more specific candidate for the harassment or delay sanction need be noted. I refer to the Rule 11 motion predicated upon the opposition's assertion in
pleadings of a frivolous claim or defense which is then allowed to lie fallow
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and is not pursued. The party who made the frivolous filing has offended Rule
11. But he has inflicted little or no cost upon the opposition or upon the court.
A Rule 11 motion filed against the party making the offensive plea would by
definition be non-frivolous. Yet such a motion could only be filed for the purpose of harassment, to teach a lesson either to the party or the lawyer, or both.
Or, perhaps counsel for a deep pocket defendant may make non-frivolous Rule
37 or Rule 11 filings as a part of an overall strategy to make the litigation so
costly that the plaintiff will run out of money before trial. Rule 11 stands as
a potent weapon we may wield to the end that such schooling be done off the
school yard and without taking up precious judicial time and resources.
We need revisit briefly the certificate requirement of Rule 11 (a), for a potentially troublesome tension within the rule arises from reading the objective standard of frivolousness found in the last sentence of Rule 11 (b) in context with
the attorney's certificate proviso. The attorney's signature, it will be recalled,
constitutes a certificate by him, inter alia, that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it. We have rejected
the notion that this imposes a requirement of reasonable inquiry prior to the
signing of the pleading or motion. Still, on the question of the nature and quantum of sanction, the court (its eye fixed to the star of general deterrence) may
appropriately consider the extent of inquiry, the time available for investigation, the extent to which the attorney had to rely upon the client for factual
information, whether the paper was based upon a plausible view of the law and
whether the attorney depended upon another member of the bar."4
Frivolous filings no doubt result from failure of inquiry. They are an obvious risk of shooting from the hip. Yet it is not at all necessary, as reflection
makes clear, that there be a connection between the attorney's certificate and
some duty of inquiry, on the one hand, and the objective frivolous standard
on the other. A motion or pleading may well escape condemnation as frivolous
notwithstanding that the lawyer dashed it off in a fit of pique without making
the slightest inquiry whether there was good ground to support it. By the same
token, a lawyer may well investigate fully a particular matter and yet make a
filing which is objectively frivolous (although we trust that the number of members of the Mississippi State Bar capable of such incompetence is minimal).
The point is of consequence because of the idea we have rejected above but
which is sincerely held by some: that the certificate requirement of Rule 11 (a)
might as well be regarded as imposing a moral or professional obligation upon
attorneys, which is not directly subject to enforcement by the court. 105 By way
104. Cf Section 4 of the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988, Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7 (Supp. 1988).
105. Holmes argued - erroneously in my view - that a right or duty had no existence "apart from and
independent of the consequences of its breach." Holmes, supra note 31, at 458. Absence of a sanction does
not deprive a rule of its status as law. H.L.A. HART, supra note 20, at 35-41, 97-107; see also Whitten
& Robertson, supra note 28, at 263-64 & nn.66-68.
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of contrast, the frivolous filings proviso of the last sentence of Rule 11 (b) and
as well the harassment or delay provisions, are subject to enforcement wholly
without regard to the certificate provision of Rule 11(a).
Another matter of concern ariges in the case of the motion or pleading which
contains several grounds, one of which is frivolous and the other of which is
not. Consider, for example, the complaint which presents a quite justiciable
claim for contract damages and perhaps even extra-contractual tort damages
but then throws in a frivolous claim for punitive damages. 106 And what of the
answer which asserts a quite arguable denial of the factual basis of liability and
an alternative pleading of our comparative negligence statute but adds a frivolous
defense of assumption of risk. The same sort of "multifariousness" may appear
in motions as well.
In one sense the answer would seem to be that pleadings and motions such
as these do not give rise to liability under the fourth sentence of Rule 11 (b).
The language of the rule refers to pleadings and motions without any express
reference to mere parts thereof. On the other hand, common sense suggests
that a party may well subject his adversary and the judicial system to a wholly
unnecessary expenditure of time, funds and other resources in the pursuit of
a frivolous claim for punitive damages or a frivolous defense of assumption
of risk. I find nothing in the language of the liability standard of Rule 11 (b)'s
fourth sentence that precludes treating pleadings and motions as divisible, 107or
which precludes focus upon parts of pleadings and motions which are frivolous.
When frivolous claims or defenses are not only signed but also filed, served
and pursued, and where delay and expense is in fact incurred by the opposing
party, not to mention consumption of judicial resources, Rule 11 may appropriately be invoked.
2. Against Whom May the Sanction Be Imposed?
Turning to the question of who may be subject to the sanction, we find the
last sentence of Rule 11 (b) employing only the word "party." Quite clearly the
rule authorizes imposition of the sanctions upon a party who makes a frivolous
filing or one for the purpose of harassment or delay.
The more important question is whether, under this part of the rule, sanctions may also be imposed upon the attorney independent of the party/client,
or jointly and severally with the party. The question is of great practical importance for the obvious reason that, in the overwhelming majority of frivolous
filings, the root cause of the expense and delay may be attributed to the attorney, not the party. If the court does not have the authority to impose sanctions
106. See Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 460 n.1 (Miss. 1983) ("[E]very attorney
filing a complaint demanding punitive damages does so subject to the provisions of Rule 11 . . ").
107. In the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988, the word "action" is defined to include: "any separate
count, claim, defense or request for relief." MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-3(c) (Supp. 1988). But are motions
similarly divisible? See Miss. CODa ANN. § 11-55-3(a) (Supp. 1988).
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upon attorneys for frivolous filings, Rule 11 is indeed a toothless tiger. No doubt
there are occasions when litigants take actions and direct filings toward their
adversary which are frivolous and which are for the purpose of harassment or
delay. In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, the litigant takes his
cue from his lawyer.
The argument may be advanced that the term "party," as used in the last sentence of Rule 11(b), should be read as including the attorney. After all, the
party doesn't actually file a motion or pleading in the overwhelming majority
of cases. That is in fact done by the attorney. The party certainly is inferior
to the attorney when it comes to acumen with which to determine whether a
pleading is frivolous. 108 If the question be put, why would anyone draft a rule
such as the last sentence of Rule 11 (b) and not include attorneys as well as parties as those subject to the sanctions? No reason readily suggests itself. If the
purpose of the rule is to deter frivolous filings, why would a draftsman want
to authorize sanctioning of the persons who infrequently would cause cost and
delay and exclude from the sanction power those who most frequently would
cause it?
Any gaps in the language of the rule here ought to be filled by reference to
the court's inherent authority to sanction attorneys for misconduct affecting the
administration of justice. 109 And, because it is wholly consistent with the implicit meaning of Rule 11 (b), as augmented by the court's inherent powers, the
Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 here furnishes a valuable guide to interpretation, as it authorizes assessment of sanctions "against the offending attorneys or parties, or both."' 10
There is a final point. Where monetary sanctions are imposed on an attorney, there will always be the possibility that in whole or in part the sanction
sum will make its way into the bill sent to the client. I am not prepared to say
that this should never be allowed. Many are the cases, however, where the class
of individuals we seek to deter will be lawyers. In those cases the court ought
to place within the sanction order an express prohibition upon direct or indirect
payment by the client. I"
3. What Sanction May Be Imposed?
The sanction here authorized certainly includes "the reasonable expenses incurred by such other parties and by their attorneys, including reasonable attorneys' fees." Inherent within the court, however, is the authority to impose such
greater or lesser sanctions as striking a party's motion or pleading, assessing
108. The suggestion in Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 511 So. 2d 112, 118 (Miss. 1987) that
parties are held to the same standards as attorneys may fit the language of Rule 11. Yet it is so intuitively
implausible that I doubt it is the best fit. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
109. See supra Part IV(F).
110. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-5(3) (Supp. 1988).
111. Cf. Goeldner v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 525 So. 2d 403, 407 (Miss. 1975).
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a monetary fine or penalty, and, in the event of extreme violations, rising to
the dignity of contempt of court, ordering incarceration. 112
VII.

THE QUANTUM OF SANCTIONS

A. What the Litigation Accountability Act Has to Offer
Monetary sanctions are by no means the only sanctions authorized by Rule
11. As a practical matter, they are the most important, those most likely to be
imposed with relative frequency, and those certain to generate the most controversy. We have considered the liability standards above and have found that,
notwithstanding substantial problems with draftsmanship and structure of Rule
11, a modest sense of order may be gleaned. On the question of the quantum
of monetary sanctions, however, the rule takes the opposite approach, one of
near silence. We are told only that, for frivolous filings, the court may order
payment of "reasonable" expenses and attorneys' fees. For wilful violations the
court may order "appropriate" disciplinary action. But "reasonable" or "appropriate" by reference to what standards or considerations?
Here at first blush the Litigation Accountability Act would appear to offer
valuable aid to construction of Rule 11. Section 4 enumerates eleven factors
which the Act insists ought to be considered in determining the amount of sanctions. 113 Yet caution is in order.
112. Culpepper v. State, 516 So. 2d 485 (Miss. 1987) was reversed because the charge was brought in
the wrong jurisdiction, not because the court had no inherent authority to impose a monetary fine and jail
term upon an attorney for constructive criminal contempt.
113. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7 (Supp. 1988). The entire section reads:
§ 11-55-7. Award of costs and attorney fees; amount of award; factors to consider.
In determining the amount of an award of costs or attorney's fees, the court shall exercise
its sound discretion. When granting an award of costs and attorney's fees, the court shall specifically set forth the reasons for such award and shall consider the following factors, among
others, in determining whether to assess attorney's fees and costs and the amount to be assessed:
(a) The extent to which any effort was made to determine the validity of any action, claim
or defense before it was asserted, and the time remaining within which the claim or defense
could be filed;
(b) The extent of any effort made after the commencement of an action to reduce the number
of claims being asserted or to dismiss claims that have been found not to be valid;
(c) The availability of facts to assist in determining the validity of an action, claim or defense;
(d) Whether or not the action was prosecuted or defended, in whole or in part, in bad faith
or for improper purpose;
(e) Whether or not issues of fact, determinative of the validity of a party's claim or defense,
were reasonably in conflict;
(f) The extent to which the party prevailed with respect to the amount of and number of claims
or defenses in controversy;
(g) The extent to which any action, claim or defense was asserted by an attorney or party
in a good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law in the state, which purpose was made
known to the court at the time of filing;
(h) The amount or conditions of any offer of judgment or settlement in relation to the amount
or conditions of the ultimate relief granted by the court;
(i) The extent to which a reasonable effort was made to determine prior to the time of filing
of an action or claim that all parties sued or joined were proper parties owing a legally defined duty to any party or parties asserting the claim or action;
(j) The extent of any effort made after the commencement of an action to reduce the number
of parties in the action; and
(k) The period of time available to the attorney for the party asserting any defense before
such defense was interposed.
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To begin with, the Litigation Accountability Act identifies assessment of attorneys' fees and costs as the only sanctions that may be imposed. Because of
the court's inherent authority to discipline attorneys, the statutory limitation should
be disregarded. The court has the power to penalize or fine attorneys for frivolous
filings above and beyond any attorneys' fees or costs actually inflicted on the
adversary. Conversely, where general deterrence would not be served, there
is certainly no mandate that full attorneys' fees and costs be assessed.
Second, and quite related, Section 4 of the Act contains a structural defect.
As indicated, the only sanction authorized is "costs or attorney's fees." This
suggests a compensatory rationale for the Act. Yet the same Section 4 fails to
include, as a factor to be considered, the amount of attorneys' fees or costs incurred by the adversary. Perhaps this is one of the "among others" factors. Not
only do the eleven factors clash with the compensatory rationale of the award
of attorneys' fees and costs, the factors commingle the objective, e.g., the availability of facts, etc., 114 with the subjective, e.g., "[tihe extent to which any
effort was made to determine..." and "[wihether or not the action was prosecuted or defended, in whole or in part, in bad faith or for improper purpose." 15
Several of the standards appear downright dangerous, e.g., "[t]he extent to which
116
the party prevailed."
The factors found in Section 4 are far too numerous. To be sure, balancing
tests are a part of the permanent legal landscape in this country. Experience
has taught, however, that balancing tests including too many factors will augment, rather than reduce, arbitrariness and inconsistent results. 11 7 Generally
three are the optimum; four the maximum; eleven are a veritable disaster.
When so many factors are listed, they will, as here, inevitably proceed upon
different and conflicting and even incoherent principles and policies, making
consistent application from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from day to day simply
impossible. This is particularly so when we are without any guide to the weight
to be accorded the several factors, or by what burden or standard the balancing
should be employed. 1II
If the Section 4 factors are to be used, we must keep firmly in mind that they
inform only the quantum inquiry, that they have nothing to do with Rule 11

114. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7(c) (Supp. 1988).

115. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-55-7(a) and (d) (Supp. 1988).
116. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7(f) (Supp. 1988).
117. Compare the experience under such diverse balancing tests as the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, § 6 (1971) (factors to be considered in locating the "center of gravity" of an action) and
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (factors to be considered
in awarding attorneys' fees).
118. In another context I have argued that the persons charged by law to perform the law's balancing
functions must be given some standard by reference to which the weighing and balancing must be performed,
else arbitrary and inconsistent results again are inevitable. See Hill v. State, 432 So. 2d 427, 451-52 (Miss.
1983) (Robertson, J., dissenting). It is not so important what the standard is as that there be some standard.
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liability. 119 I doubt, however, that this is possible. So much in Section 4 suggests imposition of sanctions where the pleader or movant did have hope of
success, or where his purpose was not harassment or delay. The very structure
of the Act, which directs consideration of these particular factors without guidance
on the quantum of sanctions depending solely upon how a given factor or factors may strike the court on a given day, all but assures that in practice the
no hope of success standard will be greatly toughened.
Consider, for example, factor (a), the extent to which there was opportunity
for diligent inquiry and the extent to which such inquiry was made. 120 We have
critiqued this notion above in the context of the liability standard. Concededly,
it is less problematic as a sanctions factor. Still it seems out of place. It places
too great an emphasis upon the individual work habits and other idiosyncrasies
of lawyers. The degree of frivolousness, or some such, would seem a more
relevant factor, given our rule characterized largely by objective standards and
its purpose of holding the cost of frivolous filings to an optimally efficient level
via a regime of general deterrence.
Factor (i), the extent to which a reasonable effort was made prior to filing
to determine that the parties sued were proper in that they owed "a legally defined duty" to plaintiff, 121 is subject to similar critique and dismissal.
Consider, next, factors (b) and (j), the extent to which any effort was made
after commencement of the action to reduce the number of claims being
asserted 122 or the number of parties to the action. 123 For one thing, I do not
regard it readily apparent that plaintiff - and these two factors seem directed
solely at plaintiffs - should get a merit badge for reducing the number of claims
or parties. Some lawsuits, even highly problematic lawsuits, by their very nature call for multiple claims and multiple parties. 124 The point of consequence
is that there is no necessary connection between factors (b)' 25 and (j) and either
frivolousness or the infliction of undesirable costs on the parties or the court.
That a case is a multiple party case or a multiple claim case hardly suggests
that it is a frivolous case. As explained above, the mere filing of (multiple)
frivolous claims imposes no significant costs where such claims are not pursued. What then is Section 4 of the Act saying to the court?
And what about factor (e): whether the outcome determinative issues of fact
were reasonably in conflict. 126 What does that mean? We are generally familiar
119. At the risk of repetition, I note - and reject - Section 4's mandate that the factors be considered
"in determining whether to assess" sanctions. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7 (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
120. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7(a) (Supp. 1988).
121. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7(i) (Supp. 1988).
122. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7(b) (Supp. 1988).
123. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7(j) (Supp. 1988).
124. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986), and particularly Justice Powell's less than perceptive footnote 3 in his dissenting opinion, 478 U.S. at 298 n.3.
125. Factor (b) ends with "to dismiss claims that have been found [by whom?] not to be valid," but because that language is preceded by the disjunctive "or," the reading we give factor (b) fits its language.
126. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7(e) (Supp. 1988).
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with the standards for passing on motions for directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. 127 Is this what is meant? Or does factor (e) incorporate the summary judgment 128 standard? Or some other?
There is a more serious problem. I trust all would agree that a Rule 11 motion should be denied when made against a party who survived a motion for
directed verdict, and even a motion for summary judgment. 129 But, as explained
above, I hardly think the converse is true. I see nothing in Mississippi's Rule
11 that mandates sanctions against parties whose claims are dismissed or defenses
stricken via summary judgment. The wording of Section 4's factor (e) is an
open invitation to just that end. Because that invitation conflicts with Rule 11,
I would reject it.
How then do we add structure to "reasonable" and "appropriate" such that
we may expect over time an optimal degree (a) of consistency in results from
county to county and from day to day and (b) of service of the end of general
deterrence? The answer is not easy. However problematic Section 4 of the Litigation Accountability Act may be, it represents a step in the right direction.
A three or four part balancing test should be developed and promulgated. The
factors should not merely be whatever comes to the draftsman's mind, but a
series of objective considerations carefully tailored to promote the end of general
deterrence.
B. A Better Four Part Balancing Test, or,
Assessing Sanctions According to Purpose
We turn now to factors that properly should be considered by a trial court
in determining what is an "appropriate" or "reasonable" monetary sanction in
a case in which Rule 11 liability has been found. At once we (re)emphasize
that the court is not limited to attorneys' fees and legal expenses. Sanctions may
and often should exceed these. The court's inherent power to assess sanctions
upon those who abuse the judicial process supplies whatever authority is needed over and above Rule II itself.
1. The Needs of General Deterrence
The dominant factor upon which the trial court should focus in fixing the
amount of sanctions is vindication of Rule lI's policy of general deterrence.
This focus is quite different from a Rule 11 liability determination. There the
court applies and enforces a rule, albeit one quite open-textured. General deterrence informs interpretation but it can never authorize a liability finding that
does not fit Rule I l's text. On the matter of sanctions our only texts are "reasona127. Stubblefield v. Jesco, Inc., 464 So. 2d 47, 54-56 (Miss. 1984); Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell,
319 So. 2d 652, 657 (Miss. 1975).
128. Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So. 2d 358, 362-65 (Miss. 1983); see also Fruchter v. Lynch
Oil Co., 522 So. 2d 195, 198 (Miss. 1988).
129. But see Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 1019 & n.27.
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ble" and "appropriate" and the unwritten text of the inherent power. We adopt
a utilitarian mode of thought.
First, we need to remind ourselves of that which we wish to deter. That is
the frivolous filing, not just the burdensome filing. Rule 11 is only incidentally
a docket control rule. It is not a rule addressing the problem of increasing complexity, even prolixity, in litigation. Our concern is the social cost of the frivolous
filing. We wish to hold that cost at an optimally efficient level. We are never
going to eliminate entirely frivolous filings and their costs. This is implied in
our frequent references to "optimal" or "minimal" levels of filings and costs.
There is a reason beyond impossibility why we shouldn't even try. I refer to
the risks of over-deterrence and excessive satellite litigation.
At whatever level - and with whatever frequency - sanctions are assessed,
affected parties will receive stimuli to action. This phenomenon occurs whether
we intend such messages or proceed unawares. We know from the federal experience that excessive sanctions will produce two results. Non-frivolous and
marginally frivolous filings will be withheld, and parties will engage in timeconsuming and expensive satellite litigation. Trial courts accordingly must proceed sensitive to the social costs we will experience from Rule 11 sanctions
that are too heavy handed, for there comes a point, for example, where the
costs of satellite litigation exceed that saved by deterring frivolous filings. Over
time such a practice would be self-defeating.
Recent studies in tort law may instruct us. There we find a growing consensus that, generally speaking, "injurers will act optimally if liability equals actual losses." 130 The aggregate social cost of accidents will be held to their minimum
efficient level when the injurers are made to pay to victims full actual losses. 131 By the time the court is ready to rule on the Rule 11 motion, the costs
of the frivolous filing (and the satellite litigation) have been sunk. The court's
goal in reallocating those costs should be future oriented. Thus only indirectly
is Rule 11 a fee shifting rule.
These considerations lead me to suggest a general approach to arriving at
the amount of a "reasonable" sanction. First, determine the amount of the private costs to the party against whom the frivolous filing has been made. This
includes legal expenses, attorneys' fees and, as well, nonpecuniary losses. To
that figure should be added the court's best estimate of its costs, computed in
130. S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 128 (1987); R. POSNER, supra note 44, at 176.
131. There is a second reason often offered in law and economics literature why damages should equal
full actual losses. Torts are restructured as involuntary transactions, or contracts, if you will. To be labeled
just, a transaction (voluntary or involuntary) must make at least one party to it better off than before (as
that party defines for himself "better off") and no one worse off. Obviously, if the injured person is not
given full compensation, he has been made "worse off' by the transaction - the outcome of which by definition we label unjust. This conclusion holds whether we employ the Pareto criteria for justice/efficiency or
the Kaldor-Hicks approach. Study of these is highly recommended but well beyond our grasp today. See
J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION To JURISPRUDENCE 212-18 (1984);

R.

POSNER,

supra note 44, at 11-15.
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a cost accounting sense. Here I would include the judge's time, the time spent
by any law clerk or research assistant, the time of other court personnel, and
a charge for use of judicial services and facilities. Again the services of a good
cost accountant seem called for.
But these two sums, when added together, do not yield the sanction. If optimal deterrence be our goal, the glitches in the system must be taken into account. Not every frivolous filing will generate a Rule 11 motion. These failures
must be made up. 132 Assume, hypothetically, that Rule 11 sanctions are inflicted on half the frivolous filings made over a given period of time. The trial judge,
finding Rule 11 liability, should initially set the sanction at double the sum of
private and public costs. The equation may be otherwise put: private cost (PrC)
plus public cost (PuC) equals sanction (S) multiplied by the probability (and
adequacy) of its infliction (P).
PrC + PuC = S x P, where S is the unknown. If private cost is $1,000
and public cost is $500, and over time roughly half of the frivolous filings are
in fact sanctioned adequately, the initial assessment of the sanction should be
approximately $3,000.
$1,000 + $500 = S x 2
Two points need be made. I offer no mathematical formula that the trial judge
may employ with his pocket computer and generate a correct answer. Moreover,
I have no illusion that our courts will ever have accurate data on the frequency
of frivolous filings incurring adequate sanctions. 13 3 What I offer instead is a
form of symbolic logic which, if employed, offers promise of adding a measure of rationality and uniformity to the sanctioning process.
Second, my formula is only a suggested first step - the first factor to be
considered in arriving at the amount of the sanction (once the court has decided
the sanction will be monetary in form). The hypothetical $3,000 sanction must
be adjusted by reference to sensitive consideration of the three factors that
follow. 134
Before leaving the factor of general deterrence, we need to emphasize its status
in the balancing process. Promotion of the policy of general deterrence is the
most important of the four factors. It is the trump card. Greater weight should
132. In addition, not all Rule 11 motions will yield optimal sanctions. These inadequacies must also be
factored into the sanction equation.
133. There is room and need for much empirical research regarding Rule 11 and its use and effectiveness.
134. Even when modified by the factors discussed below, an appropriate sanction will at times exceed
the full pecuniary loss experienced by the adverse party. Our goal is general deterrence and only incidentally
compensation. This raises the important question whether the entire sanction should be paid the Rule 11
movant, for surely we do not want to provide excessive incentives to litigants and lawyers to file motions
for sanctions. A Rule 11 victory should not be a windfall for the successful movant. In this light, the court
assessing the sanctions should not only provide what part must be paid by the party and what by the attorney
(and whether shifting is allowed). The court should further direct what part shall be paid to the Rule 11
movant and what part to the general fund of the State of Mississippi. Suffice it to say that the sum payable
to the movant should never exceed his reasonable and necessary pecuniary loss incurred resisting the frivolous
filing augmented only modestly (e.g., ten percent) as incentive to pursue the matter.
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be given to it than to the others. For what the game is all about is holding the
social costs of frivolous filings to an optimally efficient level.
2. The Fee Arrangement
The difficulty inherent in our quest for optimal efficiency is exacerbated by
the tensions of the other factors that ought to be considered, weighed and balanced
in determining the quantum of a sanction. We begin with the fee arrangement.
The deterrent capacity of the Rule 11 sanction may vary considerably with the
lawyer's arrangement. Put another way, under some fee arrangements lawyers
are able to pass sanctions on to their clients who frequently are innocent parties.
Consider the three common types of fee arrangements: the hourly rate, the
fixed fee, and the contingency fee. 135 Lawyers who are billing at an hourly
rate (plus expenses) will often have the opportunity to pass on to their clients
all or part of any Rule 11 monetary sanction (if not in this case, in the next
one). Moreover, the clients in such fee arrangements are generally of the (relatively) deep pocket variety and are better able to absorb any such passed-on
sanction. On the other hand, the lawyer handling a particular litigation on a
fixed fee basis has no such capacity (absent, of course, agreement with his client).
The lawyer handling a case on a contingency fee basis will at best have his
net income from the case reduced by the amount of the Rule 11 sanction and
at worst suffer an unrecovered out-of-pocket loss. These realities before us,
it is readily apparent that a Rule 11 sanction of, say $5,000, imposed upon a
lawyer may well under-deter frivolous filings by hourly rate lawyers and overlydeter frivolous filings by fixed fee and particularly by contingency fee lawyers.
The point becomes important when it is recognized that Rule 11 functions in
the context of much legitimate lawyer activity. If the rule is administered so
that it over-deters, that by definition means that certain categories of lawyers
are refraining from legitimate activity on behalf of their clients. Conversely,
to the extent that Rule 11 administration under-deters, the cost of frivolous filings is not held to maximum acceptable levels.
The trial judge faced with administration of Rule 11 and who seeks to achieve
its deterrent purpose but who is sensitive to the realities of under-deterrence
and over-deterrence depending upon fee arrangements has a dilemma. Surely
the way out is not to read the liability standards of the rule in a different way
depending upon the lawyer's fee arrangement. For reasons noted elsewhere,
there is a strong imperative that we achieve a relative uniformity in definition
of frivolous filing and in determining when Rule 11 has been violated from
county to county and from case to case. On the other hand, the trial judge is
necessarily vested with considerable discretion regarding the form and severity
of the sanction imposed. Though the point is not free of doubt, I am of the

135. And what of the statutory fee plaintiffs? See infra Part VI(B)(3).
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view that the type of fee arrangement and under-deterrence/over-deterrence
problems should be factored into this discretionary calculation, and that the prima
facie sanction suggested in subpart 2 above should be modified as the fee arrangement may suggest.
3. The Regime of Private Enforcement of Statutorily Created Rights, or
Legislative Encouragement of Certain Types of Actions
The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs in certain types of actions may well run counter to express legislative declarations encouraging private enforcement. We refer to those statutory schemes wherein the legislature
has established standards of conduct for certain parties, generally business firms,
and where a major part of the enforcement scheme is authorizing injured parties to recover attorneys' fees and legal expenses, thereby encouraging a regime of private enforcement. Such statutes exist at the state level. 136 Perhaps
even more on point are the federally created rights enforceable in our state courts
under a regime of concurrent jurisdiction wherein the Congress has decreed
a scheme of private enforcement, a major provision of which is the authorization of recovery of attorneys' fees by successful plaintiffs as a means of encouraging certain types of litigation. ' 37 Sanctions imposed upon parties and
lawyers bringing suits of this sort should be sensitively modified and generally
reduced.
4. The Rule 11 Movant's Duty to Mitigate His Damages
This final factor has been mentioned above and should be self-explanatory.
A party moving for Rule 11 sanctions has a duty to hold to a minimum the
costs he experiences from his adversary's frivolous filing. That duty is no less
real or enforceable than a litigant's duty to refrain from frivolous filings. This
factor is to be considered in reduction of the quantum of sanctions.
C. Non-monetary Sanctions

What we have said above concentrates upon the monetary form of sanction.
We justify such concentration because monetary sanctions are and will be most
frequently inflicted and most controversial. The monetary sanction is the highprofile sanction. The inherent power places within the court's quiver many other

136. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-31-2(3)(c) (Supp. 1987) (attorneys' fees recoverable against party
who brings attachment in bad faith); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(2) (Supp. 1987) (attorneys' fees recoverable against violator of consumer protection chapter); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-717 (Supp. 1987) (attorneys' fees recoverable by party who purchased illegal or fraudulent security); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-21-51
(1972) (attorneys' fees recoverable against foreign insurance company for bad faith).
137. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), enforced in Marx
v. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass'n, 520 So. 2d 1333, 1345-47 (Miss. 1987); The Truth In Lending Act,
Lewis v. Delta Loans, Inc., 300 So. 2d 142, 144-45 (Miss. 1974); The Fair Labor Standards Act, Mengel
v. Ishee, 192 Miss. 366, 4 So. 2d 878 (1941). See generally Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass'n, 520
So. 2d 1333, 1347-52 (Miss. 1987) (Robertson, J., concurring).
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arrows. Perhaps we have gotten the cart before the horse by concentrating on
the monetary sanction arrow before deciding that is the one we should choose.
Having in mind the purpose of general deterrence and, as well, the other factors just discussed, the court ought to select the least punitive form of sanction.
If a non-monetary sanction seems as likely to give off adequate deterrent incentives, it should be chosen over a monetary one. This should almost always
be so where, as a practical matter, an "appropriate" monetary sanction would
be ruinous to the lawyers. Mississippi has many lawyers, particularly solo practitioners, whose practice could not withstand a $15,000 sanction. This is not
to suggest that such lawyers should merely get a slap on the wrist when they
file and pursue frivolous points and inflict costs thereby; merely that the form
of such sanctions should be chosen with some care.
The variety of forms of non-monetary sanctions is limited to those which are
reasonable, which means that they are limited by the imagination and creativity of the trial court. Among those that come to mind, in no particular order, are:
(a) a private reprimand;
(b) a public reprimand;
(c) striking the frivolous filing and proceeding with the case as though
it had never been filed;
(d) an order to attend continuing legal education courses (over and
above that already mandated by order of the supreme court); or
(e) mandatory pro bono work.
Because in a very real sense a frivolous filing constitutes nothing less than
professional misconduct, referral to the Complaints Committee of the Mississippi State Bar is always an alternative that may be employed in conjunction
with other court-imposed sanctions, monetary or non-monetary.
VIII.

THREE PRACTICE PROBLEMS

A. Sua Sponte Rulings
The question may be asked whether the court may act sua sponte to impose
Rule 11 sanctions or whether it must wait for a Rule 11 motion from an aggrieved litigant. The language of the rule does not expressly address the point.
Yet we regard it implicit in the language that the court may act on its own initiative. "If a pleading or motion . . . is signed with intent to defeat . . . ,it
may be stricken . . . ." "For wilful violation . . . an attorney may be subjected to ... .""Ifany party files a motion or pleading which... is frivolous ....
the court may order . . . ." In each instance the rule's language identifies a triggering event as a prerequisite to authority to sanction. In each instance that triggering event is litigation conduct by a party and/or his attorney. At no point
does the rule read "and upon motion of a party aggrieved" or language to like
effect.
There is a further rationale for the sua sponte authority. The costs of frivolous
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filings are inflicted upon the court as well as the opposing litigant. It makes
sense that the court should have authority to protect itself, even though no litigant files a Rule 11 motion. We recognize that, as a practical matter, cases
will be few and far between when courts will act without the Rule 11 violation
having been brought to their attention by aggrieved parties. Still the authority
is there.
B. ProceduralDue Process
Of concern is the sort of hearing to which the Rule 11 defendant may of right
be entitled. We think of the familiar shibboleth of reasonable advance notice
and the opportunity to be heard. On the other hand we think of the satellite
litigation problem. The last thing we want is to wind up spending more litigating Rule 11 claims than we gain through our regime of general deterrence. Yet
the Rule 11 defendant's due process rights may not be sacrificed on the altar
of efficiency. 138
At the very least the Rule 11 defendant is entitled to reasonable advance notice that the court is considering sanctions. Often the Rule 11 motion will suffice.
In the case of sua sponte sanctions much more is required. In any event it is
difficult to imagine a case in which the trial court should impose sanctions without
giving the Rule 11 defendant a reasonable opportunity to speak his mind. Assuming sanctions are otherwise appropriate, the court should seldom make its
sanctions order the last paragraph of the order disposing of the pleading or motion. More appropriately, that last paragraph should direct the party or his attorney to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. Beyond fairness
to the Rule 11 defendant, such process may serve as an important reminder
to the trial court that the sanctions standards are different - generally stricter
- than the standards employed in ruling on the pleading or motion.
C. Findings and Conclusions in Support of Awards
There is a third practice problem. To what extent should the trial judge explain the basis of his ruling on a Rule 11 motion? In days past Mississippi trial
judges simply "ruled." The theory was that the winner didn't care what the judge's
reasoning was, that the loser wouldn't be convinced (or assuaged) no matter
what the judge said, and, besides, the chances of appellate reversal were
reduced.' 39 We have progressed beyond such thinking. The virtue of trial court
138. Here we are concerned not only with rights secured by Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 14 (1890), this State's
due process clause. Rule 11 defendants are protected as well by the due process clause of U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. Valuable federal discussions of the process federally due to Rule 11 defendants include Sanko
S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Galin, 835 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1987); Tom Growney Equip., Inc. v. Shelley Irrigation
Dev., Inc., 834 F.2d 833, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1987); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1559-61 (11th Cir.
1987); INVST Fin. Group, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 405 (6th Cir. 1987). See also
Vairo, supra note 59, at 222-23.
139. This notion relied in part upon the supreme court's practice of implying findings and conclusions
consistent with the trial court's ruling. See, e.g., Cotton v. McConnell, 435 So. 2d 683, 685 (Miss. 1983);
Harris v. Bailey Ave. Park, 202 Miss. 776, 791, 32 So. 2d 689, 694 (1947).
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findings and conclusions even on motions and interlocutory orders has become
apparent to all. We require such in some contexts;140 strongly suggest it in
others. 141
Here we give kudos to the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988. Section
4 directs that, when granting sanctions, "the court shall specifically set forth
the reasons for such award."1 4 2 1 would add only that the court should give reasons as well when sanctions are denied - at least in the case of non-frivolous
Rule 11 motions.
The reasons why the basis of Rule 11 rulings should be given by trial courts
- and, as wel', by the supreme court on appeal - should be stated, though
they are familiar. Forcing a judge to articulate the reasons for his ruling necessarilyforces him to think through the matter more carefully and, it is assumed,
make better decisions. Findings and conclusions assure a congruence between
declared rule and official action.1 43 They make possible scrutiny of whether
Rule 11 rulings are faithful to the fit of the rule and its purpose of optimal general
deterrence. Findings and conclusions keep the trial judge honest. More important, findings and conclusions are indispensable to the end of consistent and
uniform application from county to county and from day to day.
IX. CONCLUSION

I come to the end not of my subject but my discussion of it. I have tried to
progress through the subject as it ought to be considered today in our state.
I have employed modes of symbolic logic, digression and stream of consciousness where they seemed of value. My goal has not to provide correct answers
but to provoke thought, which I regard as the sole source of good answers.
So I conclude as I began. In Mississippi, as elsewhere, frivolous filings are
a problem, both real and perceived. I am acquainted with no reliable statistics
regarding the level of frivolous filings in Mississippi's courts, but I am confident the problem does exist. More precisely, I am confident that Mississippi
experiences a social cost attributable directly to the frivolous filing and that
it is the responsibility of government to direct its energies toward that phenomenon. Authority to do this is vested in the judicial department of the government
of this state. While we need all the help we can get from others, in the end
the judicial authority should be neither shared nor abdicated.
As I approach Rule 11, and the idea of a Rule 11, I am less sure.
From what has been said it is quite apparent that all would benefit from a
redrafted Rule 11. This task should initially be that of the Advisory Committee
on Rules. I think it but common sense that the committee ought to begin with
140.
141.
142.
143.

Peterson v. State, 518 So. 2d 632, 636 (Miss. 1987).
Gavin v. State, 473 So. 2d 952, 955 (Miss. 1985).
Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-7 (Supp. 1988).
See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81-91 (rev. ed. 1969).
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the present text of Rule 11 and consider, as well, incorporating ideas from the
Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 and Federal Rule 11. As valid as is the
court's inherent power to sanction parties and attorneys who abuse the judicial
process, that power to the extent feasible should be expressed in a revised Rule
11. I would hope that the draftsman of the revised Rule 11 would accept general deterrence of frivolous filings as the dominant purpose of the rule. Beyond
that, the form of the rule should consist exclusively of objective standards at
the liability and sanctions levels, with the addition of enhanced sanctions for
wilful or malicious violations.
Meanwhile, the courts of this state are obligated to interpret and enforce Rule
11 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure in the manner which best fits
the language of that rule. On points where the language is open-textured and
where the rule is less than clear - and there are many - the interpretative
problem should be resolved on a basis that is consistent in principle with Rule
1l's language, that enhances the ability of the rule to hold to an optimally efficient level the social cost of frivolous filings. I trust those so reading the rule
will find within it my penchant for objective deterrent standards, augmented
by punitive sanctions only for wilful or malicious conduct. Any gaps in the rule
beyond that point, of course, may and ought to be filled by reference to the
inherent power of the court to sanction those who abuse the judicial process
to the extent and limits of that inherent power.
We must always keep in mind that the rule is designed to deter frivolous filings, and not any other type of filings however problematic they may be. Rule
11 is only incidentally a docket control or case management rule. Those filings
subject to the sanction are those where the party or attorney has no hope of
success. That standard should be applied with sensitivity, learning as much as
we can from the twin towering infernos of the federal experience: inconsistent
and incoherent results from court to court and from case to case, and an avalanche
of satellite litigation.
The most important task ahead has hardly been mentioned. We have talked
of frivolous filings and general deterrence and symbolic logic. We have dissected Rule 11 and offered interpretative techniques. As much as we need these,
there is something we need more: empirical research. We need competent and
sensitive empirical research to tell us the nature and extent of the problem of
frivolous filings, and of the social costs incident thereto. We need empirical
research now and in the years to come on the effectiveness and effects of Rule
11 and other remedies that might be suggested. We need to learn from the federal experience, not through war stories and anecdotes, but through reliable
data. I suspect lawyers have been making frivolous filings for a long, long time.
Like the poor, perhaps frivolous filers will always be with us. The social cost
problem may be traced to sources other than frivolous filings - to increasing
quantity and complexity of legitimate filings. I am not prepared to exclude the
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possibility that our response to the frivolous filings problem should be to do
nothing. For without a broad base of empirical research what have we but a
blind guess that Rule 11 does more good than harm?

